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ABSTRACT 
As a result of being a leading world power within the community of nation states, 
the United States is confronted with the weighty task of how best to employ its influence 
in creating conditions for a sustainable, peaceful, and just international system of 
interactions between nation states. Syria and Lebanon pose some of the most challenging 
problems to policymakers working to achieve these conditions.  Exploring the historical 
origin of nationalism and sectarianism in Ottoman Greater Syria prior to the outbreak of 
World War I in 1914, may offer important insights as to unique regional attitudes and 
sensitivities with respect to democratic reform.  This study seeks to demonstrate that 
nationalists in Greater Syria within the context of a reforming Ottoman Empire prior to 
World War I failed to form a cohesive political expression of intentions through united 
action, thus allowing the formation of separate Lebanese and Syrian states.  The legacy of 
an incoherent national identity as a result of competing sectarian visions is an internally 
divided Lebanese state that struggles to overcome its ineffectual democratic institutions 
and a Syrian state encumbered by an entrenched authoritarian regime. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The separation of Mount Lebanon and other portions of Greater Syria to form the 
modern nation state of Lebanon in 1920 represented a political reality that for Arab 
nationalists was “unacceptable at every level.”1  Despite knowledge that a strong 
majority of the populace supported independence in Greater Syria after World War I, 
both Great Britain and France flouted this expression of national self-determination in 
favor of their respective national economic interests.2  Why was there no mass 
mobilization behind a single or even multiple national movement(s) in Greater Syria prior 
to World War I?  This study intends to discover how nationalists in Greater Syria failed 
to coherently express any national vision prior to World War I, and instead they 
facilitated the formation of separate states of Lebanon and Syria under French mandate. 
The implications of this study extend to the current volatility in the modern state of 
Lebanon, as internal sectarian divisions and external interests of powerful nation states 
have engendered competing nationalist visions that threaten its existence as a unified 
nation state.  Furthermore, it also provides a historical basis for the current authoritarian 
rule of the Ba’ath party in Syria and its perceived vital interests in Lebanese internal 
affairs. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
As a result of being a leading world power within the community of nation states, 
the United States is confronted with the weighty task of how best to employ its influence 
in creating conditions for a sustainable, peaceful, and just international system of 
interactions between nation states.  The Levant, including Syria and Lebanon in 
particular, pose some of the most challenging problems with respect to implementation of 
                                                 
1  Kamal S. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988), 39. 
2  Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon (London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, 2007), 78. 
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U.S. policy to ultimately accomplish the previously stated goal.  In Lebanon, the central 
problem is reconciling the interests of competing sectarian communities to reform the 
divisive and ineffectual confessional system through truth and reconciliation that 
hopefully will result in secular democracy where political interests transcend religious or 
ethnic identities.   
The principal problem in Syria is increasing the pace of democratic reform 
without either the chaos associated with a forcible change in leadership or the violent 
instability often associated with democratizing societies.  Exploring the historical origin 
of nationalism and sectarianism in Ottoman Greater Syria prior to the outbreak of World 
War I in 1914, may offer important insights as to unique regional attitudes and 
sensitivities with respect to democratic reform.  It also might stimulate discussion and 
more careful consideration of possible avenues of approach for U.S. policymakers when 
engaging Syrian or Lebanese officials on the issue of democratic reform.  
As previously mentioned, U.S. calls for honoring Arab nationalist self-
determination went unheeded by senior members of the alliance, effectively dividing 
Greater Syria into two states that were fundamentally linked through shared historical 
experience as Ottoman subjects and members of the Arab nation.  This division favored 
the interests of an outlying minority Maronite community, while ensuring the commercial 
interests of both local and European elites.  As a result, the French Colonial Mandate 
bequeathed to the Middle East a Lebanese state with a perpetually problematic 
communitarian system of governance that has been incapable of maintaining either 
internal or external sovereignty, and a jaundiced neighboring state of Syria that has 
intervened in Lebanese internal affairs, arguably in order to maintain a certain modicum 
of regional stability in the wake of declining French power.  Taking the Syro-Lebanese 
example where both external and internal factors acted to prevent Arab nationalists from 
attaining an independent unified nation state prior to World War I, may yield informative 
insights with respect to achieving a higher degree of regional stability while 
simultaneously encouraging the development of democratic institutions such as justice 
and the rule of law, free and fair elections, and a greater degree of equality for minorities 
and women.  
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are several possible problems related to the discovery of why Arab 
nationalism failed to achieve an independent, unified nation state in Greater Syria prior to 
the First World War.  Most important is the origin of nationalism in the Ottoman 
province.  Who were the movement’s original proponents, and what were their motives?  
How did the movement manifest itself politically?  Were there divisions within the 
movement that did not fall neatly along sectarian lines?  Answers to these questions are 
important; though finding an unbiased historical account is outside the realm of 
possibility.  Thus, it will be important to understand and acknowledge the inherent bias of 
each interpretation of events.  Achieving this understanding may well lead to greater 
insight of how forces both intentional and accidental came to bear on the historical 
outcome.  Another problem will be finding comprehensive statistical analysis of the 
Ottoman Empire’s political landscape, as there were no political analyses or opinion polls 
conducted by independent media sources or think tanks.  Accordingly, this study will 
have to focus primarily on the biased accounts of those officials who were directly 
involved in the relevant processes.  A third limitation associated with this study is my 
inability to read and speak Arabic, thus narrowing my range of available literature to 
either French or English publications.   
Despite these problems, this study will demonstrate that nationalists in Greater 
Syria within the context of a reforming Ottoman Empire prior to World War I failed to 
form a cohesive political expression of intentions through united action, thus allowing the 
formation of separate Lebanese and Syrian states.  This failure was attributable to three 
primary factors.  First, the increased salience of sectarian identification as a determinant 
factor in political loyalty and action among the larger population prevented a unified 
Arab national vision.  These cleavages highlighted a decided philosophical difference 
between Christian and Muslim national visions, as well as encouraging the parallel 
efforts of the Maronite Lebanists within the Christian sect.  Second, elites, desiring to 
maintain their commercial interests and social status in the Ottoman system, exercised 
conscious reluctance to openly support a nationalist movement.  Third, the movement’s 
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confinement to secrecy during thirty years of Hamidian repression limited the wider 
distribution of national ideas to the larger population of Greater Syria. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to effectively analyze the origins Arab nationalism and its failure to 
manifest itself in an independent nation state, one must take an analytical approach that 
includes close examination of Ottoman institutions in Greater Syria and whether they 
either consciously or accidentally prevented the coherent expression of Arab nationalism.  
With respect to states that emerged under colonial mandate, Beverly Crawford, provides 
a framework for taking an institutional approach to analyzing the political landscape of a 
particular state and its level of stability.  She asserted, “…Institutions embody a social 
contract between state and society.”3  The incentives or constraints included in such an 
agreement have explanatory significance vis-à-vis cultural conflict or cooperation within 
a state.  Specifically with respect to states formed under colonial influence, Crawford 
found that the colonial power “separated subjugated populations along ethnic and 
sectarian lines,” giving “political entrepreneurs” opportunities to gain political access, 
resist colonial authority, and then be principal architects of new institutions when 
independence was attained.4  This fundamental transformation that openly politicized 
society with respect to its various cultural identities, had profound implications for the 
division of political space within a state, providing the latent basis for civil conflict.  Did 
Ottoman institutions allow competing colonial interests to fracture the Arab nationalist 
movement through the external promotion of sectarianism?  To what degree were 
sectarian “political entrepreneurs” able to independently shape institutions without the 
benefit of colonial support? 
There are several historical analyses that deal with the rise of Arab nationalism, 
which vary depending upon the perspective of the author.  Kamal Salibi, wrote A House 
of Many Mansions in the concluding years of the civil war from 1975-89.  He endeavored 
                                                 
3  Beverly Crawford and CDL e-Scholarship Repository, “The Causes of Cultural Conflict: An 
Institutional Approach,” 17. 
4  Ibid., 18-19. 
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to explain how the Lebanese state had spiraled out of control into sectarian based warfare 
for over a decade.  He sought to discount the notion of Arab nationalism as “little more 
than a romantic notion whose full implications had not been carefully worked out.”5  In 
supporting this claim, he placed significant blame for the movement’s apparent failure on 
the colonial powers, principally Great Britain and France, asserting that establishment of 
separate territorial mandates after World War I effectively snuffed out any opportunity 
for an Arab “national revival.”6  He pointed to the notion of an “overt…contest between 
different concepts of nationality” that overlay fundamental “covert…tribal rivalries and 
jealousies.”7   
Ussama Makdisi in The Culture of Sectarianism criticized Salibi’s “revisionist 
history,” advocating, “The beginning of sectarianism did not imply a reversion.  It 
marked a rupture, the birth of a new culture that singled out religious affiliation as the 
defining public and political characteristic of a modern subject and citizen.”8  Makdisi’s 
preference to utilize the relevant historical context provides a more remote perspective 
than that of Salibi in terms of both distance and time.  Makdisi wrote his work from an 
American scholar’s perspective nearly a decade after the conclusion of civil conflict with 
sectarianism remaining a powerful and evolving political force in Lebanon. The latter 
wrote his work in London under the auspices of the Centre for Lebanese Studies trying to 
find an adequate explanation of why the civil war still raged in Lebanon.  With the 
phenomenon of sectarianism continuing to persist and evolve ten years after the war’s 
conclusion, Makdisi sought to apply an institutional approach in an effort to achieve 
deeper understanding that transcends Salibi’s primordialist bent, which the latter used to 
categorically dismiss past patterns as forgettable vestiges of backward early modern 
societies.  
                                                 
5  Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered, 39. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Ibid., 55. 
8  Ussama Samir Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in 
Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 174. 
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Salibi made an important point with respect to Arab identity, acknowledging that 
the origins of Arab society pre-dated the introduction of Islam, though attributed Arab 
ascendancy directly to the spread of Mohammed’s message beyond the immediate 
environs of Mecca and Medina.  He qualified the Arabs’ “lasting mark in history” made 
in the name of Islam, pointing out an important historical duality of being considered 
either Arab or Islamic.9  This development posed a conundrum for Arabs when the 
secular Western notion of nationalism gained currency in the mid-nineteenth century 
because they were compelled to identify primarily with the universality of Islam at the 
expense of their national identity as connoted by common language and cultural 
tradition.10  As a result, Arab society in Ottoman Greater Syria became striated along 
sectarian lines between Sunni Muslims, those considered deviant Muslims such as Shi’a 
and Druze, and non-Muslim Arabs such as Christians and Jews. 
Albert Habib Hourani’s seminal work, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 
detailed the development of Arab thought, including both Christian and Muslim 
intellectuals who first articulated national ideas in an effort to respond to Western 
influence in the transformative period of reform.  He asserted, “that explicit Arab 
nationalism, as a movement with political aims and importance, did not emerge until 
towards the end of the nineteenth century.”11   
Zeine N. Zeine in his work The Emergence of Arab Nationalism essentially 
agreed with this, though he did not find the evidence of underground activities of a small 
elite group of intellectuals spreading Arab nationalism in Beirut during the 1880s to be 
compelling.  In making his point, Zeine cited an interview with one of those intellectuals, 
Faris Nimr Pasha, a Christian.  Pasha refuted the idea that the group acted on nationalist 
ideals, because he felt that the salience of sectarian identities within Greater Syria took 
                                                 
9  Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered, 40. 
10  Ibid. 
11  Albert Habib Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939. Issued Under the Auspices 
of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 262. 
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precedence over those of a common Arab identity.12  C. Ernest Dawn in the compilation, 
The Origins of Arab Nationalism, edited by Rashid Khalidi et al. joined the debate, 
attributing the rise of Arab nationalism to an “intra-Arab elite conflict” that involved 
peripheral elites who had been deprived of power and influence under the Mutasarrifiya 
against those who held positions within the Ottoman system.13  Though there appears to 
be lack of consensus among historians as to the exact date or event that signified the birth 
of Arab nationalism, this characteristic uncertainty that continues to exist highlights the 
difficulty of obtaining accurate historical information in a modernizing authoritarian 
state. 
Prior to the Tanzimat reforms in 1839, the salience of this division was largely 
minimized through communal judicial separation, as Christians, Jews, and divergent 
Islamic sects were allowed their judicial autonomy under the millet system.  Salibi 
illustrated how Arab nationalism developed within this context primarily as a result of 
Arab Christian exposure to the ideas of Catholic and Protestant missionaries starting in 
the 1820s, which resonated with a uniquely Christian desire to be considered on an equal 
sociopolitical plane with their Muslim counterparts.14  Sunni Muslims reacted quite 
differently to the Tanzimat reforms of the High Porte in Istanbul that effectively deprived 
the former of their favored social status under the Islamic Sultanate. They viewed 
nationalism and Islam as ostensibly the same idea and generally did not identify with the 
universal Arab nationality espoused by Christian intellectuals.15  Salibi claimed average 
Sunnis were unable to grasp the “subtle” idea of universal equality regardless of religion, 
and that Christians merely regarded the Tanzimat reforms as an “Islamic ploy.”16  He 
attributed the actual awakening of Arab nationalism among Muslims only as a reaction to 
                                                 
12  Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism; with a Background Study of Arab-Turkish 
Relations in the Near East Uniform Title: Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism, 
3rd ed. (Delmar, N.Y: Caravan Books, 1973), 51-2. 
13  Rashid Khalidi, The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 
11-12. 
14 Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered, 44-5. 
15  Ibid., 48-9. 
16  Ibid., 46. 
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the emergence of the Young Turks in 1908.17  He concluded that beneath the competing 
visions of Arab nationalism is an ancient and enduring web of “tribal rivalries and 
jealousies.”18 James Gelvin in Divided Loyalties made the critique that considerations of 
Arab nationalism “ignored or glossed over fundamental differences that divided 
proponents of the Arab cause,” providing the movement with a false “retrospective 
homogeneity and coherence.”19  This study will seek to demonstrate the incoherence 
resident within the Arab nationalist movement, rather than focusing on an exact time or 
event that signaled its conception.  
Ussama Makdisi effectively countered Salibi’s assertion of Arab nationalism as a 
European construct adapted and shaped along sectarian lines to provide modern cover for 
ancient tribal rivalries in After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform, and Nationalism in the 
Ottoman Empire. In this work, he conducted a detailed analysis of the writings of 
Christian intellectual, Butrus al-Bustani, juxtaposed with the official proclamations of 
Ottoman official, Fuad Pasha.  He encouraged historians to look outside their traditional 
narratives, whether from the Lebanese, Syrian, or Ottoman nationalist perspective.  He 
suggested that they incorporate elements of both to perhaps better understand the 
instrumental nature of the debate in Ottoman Greater Syria about “the place of religion in 
a modem nation as well as the relationship between an emergent concept of citizen within 
a post-Tanzimat state.”20  He concluded that Bustani and Pasha both have the same goal 
of achieving peaceful coexistence, though within different paradigms.21   
Bustani’s secular nationalist view characterized the violent events of 1860 as the 
result of an emerging nation reverting to its pre-modern state.  This regression could only 
be transcended through an effort to punish those responsible on all sides and to engage in 
constructive dialogue to resolve the sectarian differences in an Arab nationalist 
                                                 
17  Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered, 47. 
18  Ibid., 55-6. 
19  James L. Gelvin, Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire 
(University of California Press, 1999). 
20  Ussama Makdisi, “After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform, and Nationalism in the Ottoman 
Empire,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 34, no. 4 (Nov. 2002): 602. 
21  Ibid., 613. 
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discourse.22  Pasha, for his part, sought to curb ancient hatreds in the “backward” 
Ottoman periphery through encouraging historical denial under the authoritarian narrative 
of severe repression and the reinforcement of sectarian autonomy.23  Makdisi cited the 
inability or reluctance of both views to reconcile sectarianism with Arab civilization’s 
eager embrace of modernity.24  This is a much more nuanced approach than that of 
Salibi.  He discussed sectarianism within the framework of a secular versus religious 
debate that occurred around the introduction of the western concept of a territorially 
defined nation state.  Leila Fawaz in An Occasion for War approached the events of 1860 
from a decidedly “post-Orientalist” angle, using an analytical framework that uses a 
“state-society nexus” in examining how diminishing Ottoman state power and its 
associated leadership hierarchy along economic and institution changes provided “the 
political space that was filled by sectarian networks.”25  
Christian intellectuals employed what may arguably be viewed as a revisionist 
version of regional history that pointed to its inhabitants sharing common origins from 
the era of the Phoenician culture.  Asher Kaufman’s Reviving Phoenicia investigated the 
origins of this dialogue. He cataloged its genesis as a popular idea among Maronite 
clergy beginning around 1840. Their exuberance dissipated under the Mutasarrifiya, 
however, as the Ottomans reasserted their authority under a Greek Orthodox Christian 
governor following the outburst of sectarian violence in 1860.  These Lebanese 
nationalist sentiments, based upon a common Phoenician national myth, reemerged under 
the banner of secular Lebanese Christians at the outset of the twentieth century.26  This 
expression of Lebanism represented what Salibi termed “Maronite particularism,”27 in a 
“great confidence game” between Maronites and Sunnis who espoused an Islamic Arab 
                                                 
22  Makdisi, “After 1860: Debating Religion,” 613. 
23  Ibid., 612-13. 
24  Ibid., 614-15. 
25  Leila Tarazi Fawaz, An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 5. 
26  Asher Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon (London: I. B. Tauris, 
2004), 5-6. 
27  Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered, 54. 
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nationalist vision.  Further complicating matters, the Shi’a, Druze, and Greek Orthodox 
were suspicious of both Sunni and Maronite claims, choosing instead to identify with a 
pan-Syrian identity that was not articulated until the 1930s by Antun Saadeh.28  At this 
point, however, Greater Syria had already been partitioned under French colonial 
mandate, making the non-Muslim voices for Arab nationalism appear muted prior to the 
critical period of state formation after the First World War.  
Kaufman viewed this exclusive national vision as a radicalizing force that 
encouraged the idea of Lebanon as a “neo-Phoenicia” or non-Arab refuge in a 
predominantly Arab Muslim region.29  These particular forms of nationalism that 
eschewed the overarching Arab version must be considered when examining how Greater 
Syria came to be partitioned into two separate nation states.   
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In attempting to answer why Arab nationalism failed to manifest itself in a single 
independent nation state prior to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it will be necessary 
to conduct an historical analysis of the critical events from 1839 to 1914 in the 
development of sectarianism and nationalism that determined the eventual outcome of a 
partitioned Greater Syria.  Prior to conducting this analysis, a comparative historical 
narrative outlining the principal sectarian versions of history within Greater Syria that 
were written to justify a particular nationalist current in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.  The analysis will primarily be accomplished through the consultation of 
secondary sources in the form of different historical narratives covering the period in 
question. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This study is organized in three principal parts.  Chapter II will outline the 
competing sectarian versions of Syro-Lebanese History, namely Shi’a, Druze, Maronite, 
and Sunni.  This narrative will be informative with respect to the historical basis of 
                                                 
28  Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered, 54. 
29  Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon, 245. 
 11
communitarian rivalries that became salient throughout the mid-nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, which had a deleterious effect on the coherence of nationalist 
sentiment within Greater Syria prior to World War I. 
Chapter III will investigate the rise of sectarianism within the context of the 
Tanzimat reforms from 1839-1860. This was a critical period where traditional 
expressions of political power and identification based upon social status were replaced 
with those rooted in religious or ethnic affiliation. This transformation created a tense and 
uncertain atmosphere of fundamental social change that revolved around how to 
incorporate the Western concept of equal treatment of all citizens regardless of religion in 
a binding social contract between a state’s ruler and its people.  Close attention will be 
paid to the 1858 revolt of Tanius Shahin and the massacres of 1860, which culminated in 
the reintroduction of Ottoman authority.  In analyzing this period, it will include an 
attempt to identify the critical factors that enabled the reification of sectarian identities 
and the emergence of competing nationalist visions within the region.   
Chapter IV will identify the competing factors that critically hindered the ability 
of the national movement within Greater Syria to achieve mass mobilization in the 
aftermath of the 1860 civil conflict under the administration of the special Ottoman 
governorate, the Mutasarrifiya, prior to World I.  These factors include a decided 
philosophical difference between Christian and Muslim national visions, the movement’s 
confinement to secrecy during thirty years of Hamidian repression, the parallel efforts of 
the Maronite Lebanists, and a lack of elite political support until the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire.   
Finally, Chapter V will draw conclusions based upon analysis conducted in the 
preceding chapters and determine what, if any, implications the incoherence of the 
nationalist movement in Greater Syria prior to World War I may have with respect to 
how U.S. policymakers might approach current policy challenges with respect to Syria 
and Lebanon.  
 12
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II. THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF SECTARIAN RIVALRY 
When the Lebanese and Syrian Republics were established under French Mandate 
on September 1, 1920, the concept of Arab nationalism was, as Salibi termed, “little more 
than a romantic notion whose full implications had not been worked out.”30  Nationalists 
in Greater Syria had failed to manifest a cohesive response to the integration of Western 
political ideals prior to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire as a result of its defeat in 
the First World War.  This allowed for the partition of Greater Syria into separate states 
under French colonial mandate, whose biased administration allowed the formation of 
state institutions based on a fundamentally exclusionary political and economic regime.  
The colonial legacy of French mandatory administrations has resulted in chronic 
instability and sectarian civil conflict in Lebanon and authoritarian dictatorship in Syria 
that persist to the present day.  The principal factors that attributed to the inability of 
Arab nationalist aspirations to achieve mass mobilization and either an independent or 
autonomous Greater Syrian state were the inflexible policies of Ottoman Sultanate in the 
wake of its own Tanzimat reforms until the Young Turk revolt in 1908 and the 
conflicting inter-sectarian and parallel intra-sectarian national visions. Underlying these 
factors were the increased salience of political cleavages along sectarian lines.  In order 
to adequately illustrate how these factors collectively prevented the coherent expression 
of nationalist sentiment, the origins of nationalist discourse in Greater Syria must be 
determined within its unique historical context.  
The Ottoman Sultanate ruled over a population of which Sunni Muslims 
comprised the majority, though there were substantial minority communities that were 
afforded a degree of autonomy within the millet system.  This “two-tier hierarchy”31 of 
Muslims situated above the dhimmi, or Jewish and Christian communities, formed a 
parallel society that profoundly influenced the development of Arab nationalism.  As 
exceptional members of the Ottoman realm, Christians and Jews occupied commercial, 
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financial and artisan sectors of the economy, while the functions of internal security, 
governance, and exercise of military power were exclusively reserved for Muslims.  In 
Mount Lebanon, this translated to a commercial class of Christians, many of whom were 
impoverished peasants, and a Druze “tribal-warrior” class whose privileges were 
legitimized with hereditary titles bestowed by the High Porte in exchange for their 
military loyalty.32  
Traboulsi argues that this early geographic stratification of Mount Lebanon along 
sectarian lines formed the basis of the society’s salient social and political cleavages 
during the era of modernization in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.33  These 
sectarian divisions remained latent within Ottoman society until the first of two Tanzimat 
reform decrees was instituted in 1839, making all subjects equal regardless of sectarian 
affiliation.   
Other rifts that transcended sect membership proved more significant prior to the 
empire’s desperate attempts at modernization.  These included the distinction between 
landed nobility, manasib, and the peasantry,‘amma, which encouraged open elite 
competition for power over who commanded larger tax revenues within the iqta’ or 
feudal system that ultimately paid tribute to the High Porte in Istanbul.  Another level of 
conflict within the pre-modern Ottoman system was frequent conflicts between local 
Ottoman governors or walis and the central authority in Istanbul.34  Modernization and 
the associated massive social and political change facilitated a shift in societal structure 
that made the above class differences and quasi-feudal context of elite competition 
obsolete.   
The institutionalization of sectarian identities as the primary basis for distinction 
in Greater Syrian society represented an elite response to the inexorable advance of 
European power and the attendant alien ideas of secular government, nationalism applied 
within a territorially defined state, and the theoretical equality of all citizens.  This shift in 
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elite competition that fell primarily along sectarian lines required a historical narrative 
that legitimized and maintained their grip on power within the new social and political 
paradigm.  Through each sect’s unique ethnic lens, these elites shaped widely various 
versions of a common historical experience.  Thus, a review of the competing versions of 
Syro-Lebanese History and their influence on state formation and governance is 
instructive in characterizing the communitarian biases present at the time of state 
formation in Lebanon and Syria and its deleterious effect on Arab nationalist sentiment. 
A. COMPETING SECTARIAN HISTORICAL NARRATIVES 
1. The Maronites 
The Maronite Christians have inhabited the area of Mount Lebanon since the 
early Islamic period.  Although their religious rites are very similar to that of the Greek 
Orthodox (although conducted in Syriac), they became allied with the papacy of Rome in 
1182 A.D.  In 1910, Presbyterian missionary and founder of The American University of 
Beirut, Henry Jessup, described the Maronite people as a largely illiterate peasant order 
with an educated clergy who are, unlike Roman Catholic clergy, permitted to marry.  
Additionally the Maronite lay community viewed their patriarch in Antioch as a papal 
equivalent even though the latter had sworn allegiance to the Holy See in Rome.35  
Additionally, Jessup remarks that, “The Maronites of Lebanon are equal to the peasantry 
of Spain in their subjection to the priesthood and in ignorance and fanatical hostility to 
the Bible and the Protestant faith.”36  This early twentieth century view of the Maronites, 
as seen through the inherently biased lens of an American Protestant missionary, 
contrasts sharply with the Maronite view of themselves as a highly successful society 
with the critically important patronage of France.37   
Following World War I, the Maronite Patriarch, Elias Hoyek, argued for the re-
establishment of what he referred to as Biblical Lebanon which included, “…the coastal 
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towns of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and Tyre and their respective hinterlands…and the fertile 
valley of the Bekaa…, which belonged to the Vilayet of Damascus.”38  Hoyek argued 
that Greater Lebanon enjoyed a separate cultural heritage from that of Syria and should 
rightfully be carved out of the Syrian Protectorate as an independent nation state.  In 
September of 1920, this is precisely what the French High Commissioner of Beirut 
decreed.39   From the beginning, the fundamental question that has undermined the 
legitimacy of Lebanon as a nation has been simply, what does it mean to be Lebanese?  
The Maronite vision of Lebanon as a distinct historical phenomenon within the Arab 
world was argued to predate the existence of Islam and explicitly linked to that of West 
and the Mediterranean versus the Eastward bias of Muslims and other Christian sects 
such as the Greek Orthodox community.  As Salibi explains: 
Theirs, it was claimed, was the heritage of ancient Phoenicia, which 
antedated the heritage they had come to share with the Arabs by thousands 
of years.  Theirs, it was further claimed, was the broader Mediterranean 
heritage which they had once shared with Greece and Rome, and which 
they now shared with Western Europe.  They also had a long tradition of 
proud mountain freedom and independence, which was exclusively theirs, 
none of their neighbours ever having had the historical experience.40 
The Maronite version of Lebanon’s essentially Western oriented, and thus intrinsically 
Christian foundations, differed significantly from those of their Sunni, Shi’a, and Druze 
Arab counterparts within Greater Syria. 
2. The Sunnis 
The Sunni version of Greater Syrian history dismisses the Maronite “Phoenician” 
argument as historically inaccurate, maintaining that the ancient Phoenicians were simply 
a group of coastal fishermen whose civilization simply died out.  Additionally, the 
documented historical evidence of Maronite isolation to the hinterlands surrounding 
Mount Lebanon combined with the extended presence of Sunni Muslims in the coastal 
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cities of Lebanon, according to Salibi, would actually make the latter more likely 
descendants of the littoral dwelling Phoenicians.41  Sunni Lebanese are keen to point out 
the well-documented historical reality that the area now known as Lebanon has existed as 
a sub-region of Syria under some form of nearly continuous Sunni rule for over 1200 
years prior to the granting of the French Mandate and the partition of Lebanon and Syria 
in to independent states.42   
The explosive spread of the Islamic faith from its origins in present day Saudi 
Arabia reached Greater Syria in the form of the Umayyad Caliphate, which spanned from 
present day Spain to India and held its capital in nearby Damascus from 661 AD through 
750 AD.  After deposing the Umayyad Caliphate, which was fatally weakened through 
internal dissent as a result of Arab exclusivism, the Abbasid Caliphate ruled roughly the 
same geographical area, minus Spain and Morocco, from its capital in Baghdad from 750 
to 1258 AD.43  During this time, the Caliphate began to decentralize itself politically, as 
the Abbasid caliphs were unable to pacify their Syrian domains that were intermittently 
embroiled in revolt out of both resentment for the region’s diminished stature in the 
Caliphate and against perceived unfair taxation.44  The independent principalities of the 
Tulunid’s and the Ikhshidids controlled Southern Syria in succession from 868 until 969 
AD while the Hamdanids ruled a principality in Northern Syria centered in Aleppo from 
845 until 1070 AD.45   
The interruption of Sunni rule in Syria occurred when the Shi’a Fatamid caliphate 
was established in Cairo in 909 AD, and conquered the Ikhshidids of Southern Syria in 
969 AD, though the cities of Northern Syria remained subject to periodic harassment 
from Byzantine forces until the end of the tenth century. The rise of the Seljuk Sultanate 
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of Isfahan in 1058, resulted in Sunni reclamation of Syria from the Fatamids in 1076.46  
In 1095, the Seljuks divided Syria into the two Sultanates of Damascus and Aleppo, 
which remained unmolested by the incursion of European forces during the Crusades.47  
In 1171, the Ayyubids overthrew the Fatamids in Cairo, occupying Damascus and 
Aleppo in 1174 and 1183 respectively.  Beginning in 1258, the Abbasid capital of 
Baghdad and its Syrian hinterlands were sacked by Mongol hordes, though the Mamluks 
of Cairo subsequently chased the Mongol army and European Crusaders from Syria over 
the next three decades.48  This was followed by a partnership between the Mamluks and 
the Abbasids, who maintained control of Syria until an Ottoman expansion in the early 
sixteenth century resulted in the end of Abbasid authority in Cairo, the relocation of the 
Prophet’s mantle to Istanbul, and Ottoman dominion over Syria which endured until 
1924.49  The Sunni version of Greater Syrian history is one of near total political 
supremacy except for an interruption of a little more than a century, which community 
leaders sought to avoid through the promotion of a Sunni led Arab nationalism prior to 
and following the Ottoman collapse. 
3. The Shi’a 
The foundation of the conflict between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims dates back to a 
crisis of succession, which took place during the mid-seventh century.  It pitted the 
powerful Syrian governor, Mu’awiyah, against the Prophet Muhammad’s cousin, Ali.  
The two aspirants to power over the rapidly expanding Islamic Empire engaged in civil 
conflict in 657 at Siffin with no clear victor, though Ali lost significant support in the 
wake of the stalemate.  This allowed Mu’awiyah to gain further power in Egypt and 
Syria, and forces loyal to him eventually murdered Ali in 661, thus leaving the former to  
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uniquely claim the title of caliph.50  The attempted rebellion of Ali’s son, Husayn, in 680 
that resulted in the latter’s death in the Iraqi town of Karbala, cemented the rift between 
Shi’a and Sunni in the Islamic community.   
According to Shiite doctrine, the whole of Islamic history since the death 
of the Prophet, as commonly understood, was a sham…as represented first 
by the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs, then by successive dynasties of 
sultans, was illegitimate and unjust.51 
The Shi’a have existed as an Islamic minority among the Sunni of Syria, whose 
interpretation of Islam and political dominance they did not accept.52   
Shi’a Islam in Greater Syria dates back to the time of the Fatamid caliphate, 
centered alternately in Tunisia and Egypt, which exerted considerable influence in the 
region from the tenth to the twelfth century, vanquishing the Abbasid client regime, the 
Ikhshidids, from Egypt and coastal Syria.53  Shi’a standing within Syria diminished with 
the Fatamid demise, as coastal cities were subjected to European Crusader and then 
Mongol incursions until the Sunni Mamluk ruler, Baybars, expelled the latter from Syria 
in 1260.54  The Mamluk rulers initiated a series of military expeditions against Shi’a 
strongholds in the Kisrawan region north of Beirut at the end of the thirteenth century, 
finally defeating the latter in 1305.55   
Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the iqta or feudal system that 
defined the parameters of social and political discourse in Greater Syria, became 
institutionalized under Mamluk power, as the Shi’a were relegated to the peasantry and 
compelled to serve their Sunni masters or muqata’ji.56  Mamluk power waned due to 
intellectual stagnation endemic to the madrasah system of education that emphasized law 
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and theology at the expense of science and the arts.57  Economic stagnation also occurred 
as a result of European trade with Asia circumventing the seaports and land routes of 
Syria via the less expensive maritime route around the African continent.  This allowed 
for the fragmentation of power within Syria. The Shi’a briefly regained a small measure 
of previously held influence with the Harfush ruling Ba’albak and northern Biqa at the 
onset of Ottoman power in the early sixteenth century.58  The reassertion of Sunni 
dominance did not bode well for the family’s fortunes. 
The Druze and Maronite ascension to prominence under the Ma’an and Shihabi 
emirates further attenuated Shi’a political power and social standing.  The Harfush 
suffered catastrophic defeat when they allied with the Ottomans and Sunni Sayfas of 
Tripoli against the Ma’an ruler, Fakhr al-Din II. He defeated their combined forces at the 
battle of ‘Anjar, destroyed the Shi’a family estate in Ba’albak, and pillaged their land 
holdings in the Biqa valley in 1623.59  Having been decisively defeated, the Shi’a were 
again condemned to the lower strata of Syro-Lebanese society until after the Iranian 
revolution of 1979, which signaled a resurgence of Shi’a power in the region under Amal.   
In the long interregnum, the Shi’a came to accept the historical explanation that 
their being geographically concentrated in the hinterlands surrounding Mount Lebanon 
was necessitated by constant persecution throughout centuries of Sunni rule in Greater 
Syria,60 despite the above historical reality of subjugation at the hands of a Druze ruler 
when allied with the Sunni governor and Sayfa clan.  This seeming historical denial may 
be attributable to the Shi’a perception that Sunni religious doctrine and historical 
narrative are both fundamentally illegitimate.  This, when coupled with centuries of 
political repression and Maronite exclusivist claims of Phoenician ancestry at the critical 
juncture of state formation, led the Shi’a to seek a categorical reversal of this  
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phenomenon of chronic subjugation.  They sought to frame a nationalist discourse in 
terms of equality based upon the common Arab language shared by all inhabitants of 
Greater Syria.   
4. The Druze 
The Druze historical narrative is perhaps the most obscure of the principal sects of 
Greater Syria.  It began as a religious movement inspired by disillusionment with the 
Shi’a Fatamid Caliphate in Egypt during the early eleventh century.  The sect’s adherents 
believe that the sixth Fatamid caliph, al-Hakim (996-1021), was God manifest in human 
form in accordance with Shi’a Isma’ili belief, though they distinguish themselves from 
other versions of Shiism in believing that al-Hakim was the last incarnation of God in 
human form and would re-emerge after his disappearance as the rightful ruler of the 
Islamic community.  The eccentric caliph was assassinated in an alleged conspiracy 
orchestrated by his sister.61   
The Druze dogma found little support in Egypt, whose population rejected the 
notion of al-Hakim’s divinity.  As a result his principal protagonist, Muhammad al-
Darazi, fled to Greater Syria with the aim of establishing an altogether new religion, 
which discarded even the Isma’ilism from which it was born.  Al-Hakim’s successor, al-
Zahir, nearly purged his domains of all Druze adherents with the exception of a few who 
escaped persecution to remain in hiding in Southern Lebanon.  This forceful repression 
effectively closed off the Druze community from the outside world, as they were 
relegated to a secretive and isolated existence in remote homogeneous villages 
surrounding Mount Lebanon for the remainder of the Fatamid and Mamluk periods. 
Although they briefly reappeared in 1097 to do battle against the Crusaders, they only 
truly re-emerged from obscurity following the Ottoman conquest of Greater Syria.62    
Following the dissolution of the Crusader states in 1291, at the hands of the 
Mamluks, the Druze survived as a community through isolation, dissimulation, and the 
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cooperation and conversion of the noble Ma’an family, which immigrated to the Shuf 
District southeast of Beirut and established the Druze city of Ba’qlin.63  In 1516, the 
Ottomans granted the Druze political autonomy in exchange for recognition of the Sunni 
caliph in Istanbul, though the political landscape was characterized by persistent civil 
conflict and intrigue amongst the different minority tribal leaders, as they were obliged to 
balance their political fortunes between the rival concerns of powerful external forces, 
namely the Turkish Ottomans, the Egyptian Mamluks, and the Persian Safavids.  This is a 
political theme that persists in the region to this day, albeit with different actors. 
This balancing phenomenon was quickly made evident when in 1518 the Ma’ans 
forsook their promise to Istanbul, siding with the local Sunni tribal sheikh, Muhammad 
Ibn al-Hanash, in rebelling against the Ottomans in an effort to restore Mamluk power to 
the region.  The Ottomans violently quashed the insurrection, capturing three Ma’an 
chiefs and executing untold numbers of rebel soldiers.  In what might seem an incredible 
shift of allegiance, shortly thereafter the Druze family sided with the Ottomans against 
Istanbul’s archrival Persian Safavids and their local clients, the aforementioned Shi’a 
Harfush of Ba’albak and the northern Biqa. The Druze family greatly benefitted from 
their newfound loyalty, gaining control of the coastal sanjaks (districts) of Sidon, Beirut, 
and Safad.64 
After a period of relative calm under the Druze emir, Fakhr al-Din I, his son, 
Fakhr al-Din II, sought to capitalize upon Istanbul’s preoccupation with internal intrigue 
and the Safafvid threat. He allied with the Kurdish leader of Aleppo, ‘Ali Janbulad, 
against the Ottomans in a failed revolt in 1605-7, after which he maintained power 
through payment of a substantial indemnity to the Ottoman governor in Damascus.  He 
consolidated his position, gaining support of the Maronite Khazin family, and he 
employed them as political agents or mudabbirs.65  This formed the social norm within 
Greater Syria of Druze serving as warriors with the political consul of Maronite advisers.  
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Perhaps more significantly, he gained the favor of the Catholic Pope, Gregory XIII,66 
marking the beginning of European indirect influence in the region subsequent to the 
ineffective and costly campaigns of the Crusades in preceding centuries.  Fakhr al-Din II 
alternately defied and supported the High Porte in Istanbul, while similarly shifting his 
local alliances to serve his political interests that superseded any sectarian or family 
loyalty.  This reluctance to adhere to a strictly sectarian ethos might be explained in 
Traboulsi’s claim that the primary factional concern during this period was the Qaysi-
Yemeni conflict,67 one that pre-dated Islam.   
Fakhr al-Din II’s appetite for political power and territorial expansion eventually 
exceeded the tolerance of the Ottomans, particularly after having defeated the combined 
Sunni/Shi’a forces of the Sayfas of Tripoli and the Harfushs who were aligned with the 
wali or governor of Damascus, whom he held captive in 1623.  This humiliating 
circumstance, coupled with Tuscan support, led Istanbul to initiate a punitive military 
campaign that resulted in Fakhr al-Din II’s ultimate defeat and execution.68  Following 
the re-establishment of Ottoman control in 1633, almost two hundred years of internal 
Druze rivalry ensued, decimating the population.   
The fall of the Ma’an family in favor of the Sunni Shihabs at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century allowed the Maronites to gain political power at Druze expense.  
Shihabi emirs exploited internal Druze elite rivalries and encouraged the development of 
a powerful Christian elite through the employment of muddabirs or political agents who 
were products of Western missionary education.69  During the transformative period of 
the early nineteenth century the Druze would suffer devastating defeat at the hands of 
their rival Sunni and Maronite muqata’jis.  Bashir Shihab II, who converted to 
Christianity to gain Maronite backing, literally and figuratively decapitated the Druze, 
killing Bashir Junbalat in 1825, and forcing the vast majority of Druze muqata’jis into 
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exile, distributing their lands among his relatives.70  The Druze endured further 
humiliation and defeat during the period of Egyptian rule under Ibrahim Pasha from 
1831-39, as Bashir II’s rule yielded to a far more coercive and centralized Egyptian 
regime.  Bashir quickly accommodated Egyptian rule, whereas Druze elites such as the 
Janbulats and Nakads, who remained loyal to the Ottomans, were forced in to exile.71   
During these decades of Druze revolt and subsequent defeat, the influence of the 
Maronites and Protestant missionaries increased in the formerly Druze dominated areas 
with the backing of their European sponsors.  These developments, coupled with the 
rising power and influence of European states, led to a bitter conflict in 1860 between the 
Druze and Maronites, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.  From this 
time until the Druze revolt of 1909, there were frequent clashes between Druze and 
Ottoman forces.72   
This history of conflict and resistance led to mutual distrust between the Druze 
and anyone seeking to establish authority over them.  They had been expelled from Egypt 
as a result of what the Druze perceived as impiety amongst the Fatamid Shi’a.  Sunni 
Shihabi emirs had manipulated their loyalty and stolen their land with the aid of Maronite 
usurpers and Egyptian occupiers.  Finally, as a result of sectarian violence, the Ottoman 
government in attempting to reassert its authority, discounted their loyalty and labeled 
them a deviant sect in the unruly Greater Syrian backwater of their crumbling empire.  
This historical perspective manifested itself in a very real way during the formation of the 
Lebanese Republic.  History had imbued the Druze with a “Mistrustful suspicion of the 
majority…helped keep the Druze isolated from their neighbors and fiercely loyal to their 
own group.  It also made them an ideal target for the French…to undermine Arab 
nationalism and its quest for Arab unity in the wake of the Ottoman collapse after World 
War I.”73 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
The four principal sects in Greater Syria possessed vastly divergent historical 
narratives at the critical moment prior to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.  Their 
disparate memories emanated from a society that was not characterized by the same rigid 
sectarian cleavages that existed at the conclusion of the First World War, though the 
previous discussion illustrates that the aperture of the historical lens was indeed shaped to 
reveal a uniquely ethnic account used to affirm or deny a particular nationalist affiliation.  
This inherently divisive phenomenon was instrumental in the disjointed and ultimately 
unsuccessful movement to create a single Arab nation state prior to World War I.  An 
example of this is the Sunni nationalist argument that for nearly the entirety of Islamic 
history, Sunni Caliphs or Sultans ruled the area previously known as Southern Syria and 
thus any nationalist government should be formed with a Sunni head of state.  The 
historical validity of this assertion, despite openly defying basic democratic principles of 
equal access to power regardless of race, stands in stark contrast to the Phoenician basis 
of Maronite Lebanism articulated by Michel Chiha.74  The Sunni legacy in Syria is based 
on recorded, independently verifiable historical record and geographical reality, as 
opposed to the Maronite historical mythos of a primarily unverifiable ancient past used to 
justify a religious alliance between a minority group of Christians and the Papacy backed 
by French force of arms.   
In the Sunni view of history, Maronite claims of Lebanese exceptionalism were 
not simply misguided, but politically manipulative. Sunnis perceived themselves to be 
under assault from subaltern minorities, namely Christians and Zionists, who sought to 
use the Tanzimat reforms as well as European capital and arms as a vehicle for 
revolutionary change that would deprive Sunnis of their socially privileged position.  
Thus, perhaps in reaction to these perceived threats, for Sunnis “Arabism was little more 
than another name for Islam…”75 and “Arab history was inseparable from the history of 
the Sunnite Islamic state,” for in the mind of the Sunni, “…there was no vision of history 
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…worthy of being called Arab national history…” due to the practical reality that, “Arab 
nationalism essentially involved the reclamation of the Islamic caliphate.”76  
It is this gulf between historical perspectives that rendered the foundation of 
nationalist discourse in Greater Syria prior to the Ottoman Empire’s demise 
fundamentally unsound.  An examination of the principal intellectual currents of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries will be conducted in Chapter Three to illustrate 
this point; however, in order to better inform such a discussion, it is necessary to conduct 
an examination of the origins of sectarianism in Greater Syria. 
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III. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SECTARIANISM 
A. THE RISE OF SECTARIANISM IN GREATER SYRIA 
Having examined the vastly different historical myths that served to perpetuate 
individual sectarian interests at the time of state formation in Lebanon, it is now 
necessary to examine noteworthy events in the history of Greater Syria, which portended 
the emerging primacy of these divisive concerns.  The sectarianism that became 
institutionalized throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, profoundly shaped 
the nationalist debate within Greater Syria.  It included inter-sectarian differences 
between Christians and Muslims, as well as intra-sectarian rivalries between Maronite 
Christians and their Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox co-religionists.  These divisions, 
in addition to other factors discussed in the following chapter, proved critical to the 
inability of nationalists in Greater Syria to achieve mass mobilization for a separate Arab 
state prior to World War I and allowing for the eventual partition of the territory under 
colonial French mandate. 
1. The Destablization of the Muqata’ji Order 
Fawwaz Traboulsi details the complex dialectic that characterized the Ma’an and 
Shihabi emirates under Ottoman rule in his account A History of Modern Lebanon, which 
includes the complex relationship among the military power of Druze chieftains, 
Maronite ascendancy with increasing levels of popular education and European support, 
the increasingly marginalized and repressed Shi’a, and the often distracted Sunni elites of 
the High Porte in Istanbul. This last group concerned themselves more with external 
threats than with problems within their own domain.77   
Despite formal religious ties between the Maronite Church and the Roman 
Catholic Church that date back to the 1180 Maronite recognition of Vatican supremacy,78 
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western interest in Greater Syria truly intensified with the introduction of the silk trade 
during the rule of the second Ma’n emir, Fakhr al-Din II, during the first thirty years of 
the seventeenth century.  In addition to encouraging commercial ties with the West, the 
silk trade transformed the demographics of Mount Lebanon.  Maronite peasants were 
encouraged to settle in southern Druze regions to work the land at the expense of the 
Shi’a population, who were forcibly evicted.  Though immediately profitable for the 
Druze emir and his extended family, Maronite settlement ultimately made Christians a 
majority population in southern Lebanon. This created a “complex asymmetry [that] 
served as the matrix upon which the sectarian system and sectarian mobilization were 
built.”79  This population shift, coupled with increasing numbers of European missionary 
educated Maronites, created a new class who served their Druze overlords as mudabbirs 
or political agents.  This growing Maronite elite gained wealth through their privileged 
status and began to rival their Druze and later Sunnite (Shihabi) landlords or muqata’ji.80  
Thus, the established allegiances within the community became obsolete, as Maronites 
grew in number and political strength in Mount Lebanon.  This fundamental demographic 
change stretched the traditional system to its breaking point, which in turn significantly 
shaped the incoherent nationalist vision of the population of Greater Syria. 
2. The Tax Revolt of 1820-1 
This split first became evident in the peasant tax revolt of 1820-1, where 
Christians, Sunnis, Shi’a, and Druze in the northern enclaves of Mount Lebanon 
cooperated in an attempt to reduce the level of taxation under Bashir II.   In his rise to 
power, the Sunni emir, who practiced Christianity in private,81 had played Druze elites 
against one another, waged successful military campaigns against Shi’a, Sunni, and 
Alawi elites, and excluded Maronite muddabirs from his regime.  Having consolidated 
his power, Bashir II formed an alliance with the Druze leader, Bashir Junblat.  Despite 
these backhanded political machinations, the majority of Druze and Christian landowners 
                                                 
79  Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, 7-8. 
80  Ibid., 18. 
81  Engin Deniz Akarli, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920 (University of California 
Press, 1993), 21. 
 29
refused to participate in the revolt. They consciously separated themselves from the 
“commoners” who proposed action against the emir.82  All of these elite actions were in 
accordance with the pre-modern social paradigm of elite competition for land and 
influence that transcended sectarian differences.  Despite the failure of Druze and 
Christian elites to break with the status quo ante and side with the peasants against the 
consolidation of power exercised by Bashir II, Traboulsi argued that this rebellion 
represented the beginning of the end of the muqata’ji system.83   
The Christian “commoners” who led the revolt were not uneducated peasants. 
They were wakils, elected village officials who were equipped with missionary education 
and accountable to their constituents.  They now agitated for political representation and 
reduction of tax burdens that and their co-religionists no longer desired to shoulder.  
Their grievances also included claims that the Druze community “enjoyed a privileged 
position in the system.”84  Framing their demands within a sectarian context 
demonstrated a shift away from the traditional lines of differentiation based upon social 
standing and regional affiliation. 
This revolutionary phenomenon both proved and disproved two key elements of 
the eventual elite emphasis on sectarian identification as the primary currency of political 
discourse in Greater Syria.  It proved to be the initial threat of the Western political ideal 
of a well-defined social contract between a ruler and the ruled against the entrenched 
Ottoman system of local elite competition for power and influence.  It was a regime that 
had summarily excluded the interests of those outside the ranks of the titled elite.  This 
revolt forced notables to address the demands of a better-informed lower segment of 
society.  The reluctance of Druze and Maronite elites to counter a Sunni rival was due to 
realist concerns of maintaining social position within the hierarchical muqata’ji system.  
While cooperating with Bashir II effectively quashed the revolt, notables in Greater Syria 
now faced a growing vertical threat to their power from below, while still facing the same 
horizontal challenges from other notables. 
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The upper strata of society responded to this menace to their hitherto unassailable 
power with increased emphasis on sectarianism.  They emphasized superficial differences 
of ethnicity and politicized spiritual belief to engender fear of the other, effectively 
distracting the population from attaining more just and equitable forms of governance.  It 
disproved the assertion made by Ottoman authorities, trying to make sense of the 
sectarian violence in 1860, that the conflict between rival sects in Mount Lebanon was 
necessarily primordial in nature.85  The sectarian strife and violence that marred the 
following decades did not represent what Ottomanist thinkers characterized as a 
“primordial outburst of long-standing indigenous hatred.”86  It was the rejoinder of an 
imperiled aristocracy to the increasingly tangible threat of Western ideas. 
In support of the above assertion, Bashir II moved, debatably with such fears in 
mind, to reduce the salience of class divisions that were highlighted during the revolt in 
favor of sectarian rivalries.  He accomplished this through official conversion to 
Christianity, an alliance with the Maronite Church, and violent repression.87  The 
cumulative effect of these maneuvers succeeded in eliminating popular opposition to his 
policies.  In an effort to further consolidate his power, he turned his newly discovered 
community against his erstwhile Druze allies, highlighting sectarian cleavages that 
overshadowed the conflict between landowner and peasant.88  The powerful combination 
of the Maronite Church and Bashir II had garnered nearly unanimous support of the 
Maronite muqata’jis while dividing the Druze and Shi’a nobles.  The emir’s forces 
crushed the dissident Druze/Shi’a force at Mukhtara89, demonstrating the poltical and 
military potential of sectarian unity. These measures to consolidate his power proved to 
be fleeting. The next significant political upheaval came from without.  Within half a 
decade, French-backed Egyptian forces challenged Shihabi supremacy in Mount 
Lebanon. 
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3. Egyptian Rule 1831-9 
The 1831 Egyptian invasion of Syria under the son of Muhammad Ali Pasha, 
Ibrahim Pasha, introduced the new dynamic of external Great Power competition to the 
previously insular polity of Greater Syria.  With Ibrahim’s forces threatening Istanbul 
itself in 1833, Ottoman sultan, Mahmud II, procured Russian support against further 
Egyptian advances in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.  French and British diplomats, eager 
to limit Russian influence in the region, forced the High Porte and the Egyptians to sign 
an armistice that gave the latter sovereignty over Greater Syria and the Turkish district of 
Adana.90  The years of Egyptian rule in Greater Syria arguably served as a catalyst in the 
region’s transition from a feudal mode of political discourse based upon social status to 
one based upon a sectarian mosaic of competing nationalist visions. 
The successful conquest and subsequent occupation of Greater Syria might 
potentially be viewed as the beginning of Arab nationalism, though evidence of this is 
weak.  In Hourani’s Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, he quoted a French visitor to 
Ibrahim’s quarters in Greater Syria who claimed that the Egyptian ruler sought to “give 
back to the Arab race its nationality and political existence.”91  Although Ibrahim openly 
disowned his Turkish heritage,92 his father’s administration used Ottoman Turkish and 
limited the upward mobility of Egyptian Arabs to responsible positions within the 
bureaucracy.93  Thus, the notion of Arab nationalism owing its roots to a power struggle 
between Turkish rulers over Greater Syria seems problematic at best.   
Ibrahim Pasha’s establishment of municipal councils, a Western institution, 
carried unintended consequences for the political climate of Greater Syria.  Though they 
possessed little real power compared to larger French and Shihabi Maronite commercial 
interests, their establishment enabled the development of a political body whose 
membership was allocated along sectarian lines that openly challenged the hegemony of 
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the French/Egyptian subsidized rule of Bashir II and Ibrahim Pasha.94  These councils 
altered the political landscape, forcing marginalized muqata’jis to decide between losing 
their privileged lifestyle by opposing Egyptian rule or siding with their fellow elites 
against “commoners.”  This sectarian institution demonstrated an open challenge to the 
traditional political discourse within Greater Syria, as they operated outside of the 
traditional vertical non-sectarian subject-ruler paradigm embodied in the muqata’ji 
system.  
Though he managed to confine the military power of the muqata’ji to his loyal 
ally, Bashir Shihab, Ibrahim Pasha faced widespread Druze discontent with his 
legislation mandating universal conscription.95   In response to this threat, Ibrahim 
temporarily and selectively exploited a sectarian dialogue to his advantage, though 
stopping short of converting to Christianity as Bashir II had done.  Instead, he armed 
Christians, whom he did not label as “infidels,” against Druze chieftains and Shi’a, who 
Ibrahim conversely labeled as “heretics.”96  After Christian forces under Bashir II 
defeated the Druze chieftains, Ibrahim Pasha mandated in a letter to his loyal emir that, 
“As regards the Druzes of Jabal al-Shuf, let bygones be bygones.  Do not harm them 
when they return to their homes.”97  The Egyptian ruler’s son did not desire to plunge his 
father’s Syrian colony into sectarian warfare.  In order to avoid further instability, he 
momentarily used the divisive discourse to motivate a Christian constituency to serve the 
interests of a foreign [Egyptian] ruler in suppressing a population of compatriots. 
Ibrahim, fearing Christian revolt and wishing to rapidly reclaim the status quo 
ante,98 then disarmed his Christian militia causing them to rise up against his rule in 
concert with Druze, Sunnis, and Shi’a forces.99  In this instance, landowning elites joined 
with commoners against Ibrahim’s external power, though many did so in the hopes of 
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regaining lost privileges100 rather than fulfilling nationalist or sectarian ambitions.  The 
elite had a public reluctance to associate their actions with a particular religious or ethnic 
cause. This was their private and desperate struggle to maintain privileges and status 
under a French sponsored Egyptian occupation. The muqata’ji had, perhaps accidentally, 
created a catalog of sectarian memories that would provide the basis for conflict in the 
coming decades.  Such sentiments only gained currency after the combined Ottoman, 
British, and Austrian forces expelled Egyptian forces from Greater Syria, ushering in a 
period of Ottoman reforms known as the Tanzimat. 
4. The Tanzimat and the Establishment of the Qa’im Maqamiya 
The Tanzimat reforms, initiated by the Ottoman sultan beginning in 1839, were 
designed to procure British and Austrian military assistance against his Egyptian rivals. 
These reforms contributed to the fundamental paradigm shift of political interaction in 
Greater Syria.  The imperial decree promised administrative reforms that abolished tax 
farming, standardized conscription, and eliminated corruption to “all Ottoman subjects, 
regardless of their religion.”101  The British then led a campaign with Austrian, Ottoman, 
and Syrian support that ended Egyptian rule in 1840.   
Syrian commoners and their muqata’ji cooperated in the revolt with the common 
interest of ridding their society of Egyptian occupiers, though each group had different 
end goals in mind.  The commoners sought an end to the “unbearable ‘tyranny’”102 that 
had cast its shadow over Greater Syria for nearly a decade.  They aimed for increased 
liberty and a return of legitimate rule called for under the imperial decree.  Elites desired 
a restoration of their privileges that had been curtailed under the oppressive juggernaut of 
the Egyptians and their Shihabi agents.103  The victorious Ottoman and British 
governments also approached the aftermath of Egyptian occupation with varied 
perspectives.  The former sought to restore the High Porte’s sovereignty in Greater Syria 
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in a “secular project of imperial renewal.”  The British who “read Mount Lebanon in 
religious tribal terms” viewed it “as a sectarian project of local restoration.”104 
In an effort to restore the old muqata’ji system and return Greater Syrian society 
to its condition prior to the Egyptian invasion, the Ottomans installed Bashir II’s cousin, 
Bashir Qasim, as emir of Mount Lebanon.  This satisfied Maronite desires for a Shihabi 
Christian leader who would guarantee their political supremacy in Mount Lebanon and 
protection for his communal constituents within Ottoman domains.  A British initiative to 
establish a sectarian council with representatives allotted by religious affiliation and 
elected by their respective patriarchs tempered their satisfaction.  The Druze were 
dissatisfied on both accounts, as irredentist claims to property and privileges were only 
partially fulfilled, and they rejected Maronite traditional claims to political supremacy 
over Mount Lebanon.105 
The first proclamation inspired greater Christian assertiveness in extending the 
gains achieved during the Shihabi Emirate and Egyptian rule.  The Maronite Church, 
backed by French diplomats, advocated a return to the Shihab emirate as experienced 
under Bashir II.  The Ottomans, backed by British and Austrian diplomats, only partially 
satisfied Christian demands in 1843, dividing Mount Lebanon into northern and southern 
districts termed qa’im maqam.  An Ottoman Muslim governor was appointed to oversee 
both districts, with the northern district placed under the rule of Christian Emir Haydar 
Ahmad Abi-l-Lama’ and the southern district under Druze Emir Ahmad Arsalan.106  
These qa’im maqams were chosen in an effort to reduce the power of the traditional 
ruling families and to balance the competing interests of external powers.  The French, 
Austrians, Egyptians, and Maronite Church lobbied for the return of the Shihabi emirate. 
The British and the Russians favored direct Ottoman rule over Greater Syria.107 
This development angered Christians.  The Maronite Church demanded that the 
Christian population within the Druze district be placed under the northern emir, touching 
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off Druze/Christian violence in the mixed districts of the southern qa’im maqamiya.  As a 
result of the Tanzimat decree and the political division of Mount Lebanon, the Druze 
found themselves a minority compelled to share power with Christians, who the former 
considered a “subaltern majority”108 that had unfairly gained economic power with 
European help.  In addition, the Ottomans had implemented the wakil system in the 
southern district, which provided a Christian and Druze agent to act as community 
advocates to the Druze qa’im maqam, in order to prevent injustices in matters of law and 
taxation.109  The Druze, as an Islamic sect, ironically felt betrayed by the Muslim Sultan 
in Istanbul.  The muqata’ji system that had traditionally empowered Druze chieftains 
through tax farming and military power had been undermined by European style reforms 
that deprived them of their monopoly on land and power.   
In 1845, the sultan intervened, sending Ottoman troops to stem the violence and a 
political envoy, Shekib Effendi, to implement a series of reforms.  These inadequately 
dealt with fundamental issues of Druze muqata’jis losing their power and demands for 
increased political representation for Christian commoners.  Instead, Effendi’s règlement 
institutionalized sectarian representation in Mount Lebanon, giving each religious 
community a councilor and a judge on the southern district council.  This further diluted 
the power of Druze muqata’jis, as Christian councilors administered judicial and 
administrative affairs for co-religionists.  In the Christian-ruled north, councils and 
sectarian representation were not instituted.  This left Christian commoners without a 
voice in the district’s political affairs that were run by Khazin and Hubaysh family 
muqata’jis, who were loyal to the Maronite Church.110  Ignoring the social problems 
associated with Tanzimat reforms, the High Porte chose an inadequate sectarian solution 
that only strengthened the grievances of Druze chieftains and Christian commoners.  This 
political misstep caused further violence that resulted in tragic atrocities, killing many 
innocent civilians, weakening Istanbul’s authority within Greater Syria, and inviting 
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greater European intervention in regional affairs.111  The qa’im maqamiya system that 
was intended to fill the void created with the end of the Shihabi emirate and to limit the 
growing sectarian tensions through geographic partition failed on both accounts.  It 
created a power imbalance that left ahali or commoner demands for increased political 
representation unresolved, while traditional Christian and Druze elites were deprived of 
the power and influence they had enjoyed under the muqata’ji system.  This proved a 
recipe for further violence of an increasingly sectarian nature in the form of revolt, 
retribution, and ultimately Ottoman repression. 
5. The Kisrawan Revolt of 1858-9 
In conjunction with weakening Ottoman influence, sectarian violence, and greater 
European leverage over Mount Lebanon’s internal affairs, there came the first rumblings 
of civil conflict that would destroy the qa’im maqamiya and open Greater Syrian society 
to competing nationalist visions both within and without the Ottoman framework.  The 
Kisrawan revolt involved intra-sectarian rivalries that pitted Christian commoners against 
Christian Khazin muqata’ji in the northern district.  The conflict represented what 
Ussama Makdisi asserts was an alteration from the traditional elite led “religiously- 
expressed violence [that] regulated and upheld secular boundaries between epistemic 
communities,” to mass violence that “subverted the boundaries between the communities 
of ignorance and knowledge.”112  This effort to overturn the traditional social hierarchy, 
had its origins in the Tanzimat, as the second decree or Hatt-i Hümayun promulgated in 
1856, provided the commoners with a new knowledge of their place in Ottoman society. 
This empowered them to interject their concerns in a political dialogue that was 
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envisioned the reform effort as a “secular project of imperial renewal,”113 though they 
unknowingly unleashed the forces that ultimately destroyed those “secular boundaries” in 
favor of a “populist religious discourse.”114 
In the case of the Kisrawan revolt, Christian muqata’jis refused to adopt judicial 
and administrative reforms for their Christian subjects that had been implemented in the 
mixed Druze/Christian southern qa’im maqam.  The Christian ahali, or commoners, 
advocated for reform in accordance with the Tanzimat that called for social equality of 
commoners and muqata’jis, as well as sociopolitical equality of Mount Lebanon’s 
minority Christian population with the Muslim majority of the Ottoman Empire.115  The 
rebels did not seek to overthrow local rulers or challenge the authority of the Sublime 
Porte.  Instead, they viewed themselves as being the sultan’s loyal subjects who wished to 
consolidate the perceived political gains as decreed in imperial reforms within the 
Ottoman system.116  The revolt proved a shocking phenomenon to both Ottoman officials 
and local elites alike because they had viewed the ahali as “a politically quiescent 
population…a passive community whose legitimate and lawful needs were represented 
by others.”117  
The leader of the rebellion, a muleteer named Tanius Shahin, communicated rebel 
demands using a sectarian dialogue that identified Christian religious freedom with social 
equality.118  This form of political discourse called into question the established Ottoman 
hierarchy based upon religiously defined communities demarcated by secular boundaries. 
In that situation, elites interacted within a system of overlapping non-sectarian interests 
and loyalties.  This popular assertiveness, clothed in religious rhetoric, reflected the 
increasing disregard of the Maronite clergy for the central authority in Istanbul.  They 
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would temporarily bow to the wishes of the latter, however, when the demands of the 
rebellion exceeded the political space and physical power afforded to it.   
Despite succeeding in unseating the Khazin family, establishing a representative 
council comprised of peasants, wealthy farmers, clergymen, and merchants that governed 
the affairs of Kisrawan for two years, the movement ultimately failed to agree upon who 
should retain executive power.  In this instance, the neutrality of the Maronite Church 
proved fatal to the rebellion’s ultimate success.  Acting as intermediary between 
commoners and landowners, it filtered the demands of the former, excluding key requests 
for more equal land distribution and better conditions for tenants.  Without Church 
support for a popularly elected governor and deficient representation of rebel 
socioeconomic demands, the movement degenerated into riots, looting, and general 
lawlessness forcing rebel leader, Tanius Shahin, and the Maronite patriarch to renounce 
the actions of those they claimed to represent.119  Additionally, the Kisrawan rebels failed 
to gain the support of the French, as the latter desperately endeavored to dissociate itself 
with the former and maintain allegiance to the Khazin family who had served as French 
consuls since the seventeenth century.120  Though Kisrawan rebels fell short of fulfilling 
their ultimate goals of social equality between peasant and landowner, Christian and 
Muslim, the movement demonstrated the obsolescence of the traditional social order.  In 
its place emerged competing sectarian national visions within the collective psyche of 
minority communities in Greater Syria.  The sectarian divisions would be further 
institutionalized in violent civil conflict that ravaged the Ottoman province the following 
year. 
6. The Sectarian Violence of 1860 
The civil conflict of 1860 in Lebanon and Damascus served as the violent 
conclusion to the collapse of the muqata’ji system and its traditional secular modes of 
knowledgeable elite domination over an ignorant populace.  The outcome of the heinous 
violence that took the lives of thousands and maimed many more, did not result in the full 
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implementation of the Tanzimat decrees that mandated the equality of all citizens 
regardless of sectarian affiliation.  Instead, it compelled elites to awaken from a state of 
apparent denial of the nature of the political reality within a reformed Ottoman Empire. 
They had to adjust their basis for legitimacy in predominantly sectarian terms. 
While Tanius Shahin’s Kisrawan revolt that insisted on Christian equality under 
the Tanzimat served as a precursor to the violence of 1860, there were additional forces at 
work that spurred the violence.  Leila Fawaz points to the shift of local elites from 
guarantor of order and security for a particular religious community, who willingly ceded 
such authority in a strict hierarchy, to one of tacitly inviting violence into their 
domains.121   Though she stops short of providing possible reasons for this shift, the 
preceding discussion of events beginning with the Tax Revolt of 1820, reveal a steady 
erosion of elite power under the centralizing power of Bashir Shihab, Egyptian rule in the 
1830s, and then with the reassertion of Ottoman power after 1840, and the eventual 
partition of Mount Lebanon.   
In addition to these events, Tanius Shahin’s actions in the Kisrawan revolt 
presented distinct challenges to traditional elite hegemony in Greater Syria.  These 
included the rebel leader’s open rejection of the Ottoman governor’s representative, Emir 
Yusuf ‘Ali Murad; Shahin’s claim to represent all Christians and incite his co-religionists 
in the mixed southern district to rise up against their Druze overlords; and his claim to 
knowledge that had been previously reserved for the titled elite.  This sequence of 
increasingly blatant challenges to the established order, fractured the traditional solidarity 
of Druze and Christian notables.122   Christian notables were presented with the difficult 
dilemma of either alienating their co-religionists through maintaining the status quo or 
siding with the “ignorant” ahali against the authority of the Sublime Sultanate.  Druze 
elites, on the other hand, were fearful that the Christian population in their districts might 
agitate with similar demands.  This unprecedented shift in political discourse brought 
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about an atmosphere of high tension, “panic,” and “sheer apoplexy” among all elites 
including local, European consuls, and Ottoman officials.123   
In spite of the heightened sectarian tensions, there were no effective actions taken 
to prevent the spread of violence.  Perhaps both Ottoman and local elite permissiveness 
towards inter-sectarian violence that rapidly accelerated in frequency in the early months 
of 1860, served as an avenue for reclaiming lost authority without risking open rebellion 
against Istanbul or alternatively avoiding the fate that had befallen the Khazins in 
Kisrawan.  Though a collective explanation for elite failure to contain the violence 
leading up to and during a series of armed confrontations and retribution killings that 
included the massacres of Hasabiya, Rashaiya, Deir al-Qamar, and Damascus from May 
through July is problematic, Makdisi points out that it was evident that traditional leaders 
were “simply not capable of coming to terms with a genuinely popular dimension to 
communal discourse, and yet…were increasingly aware that they could no longer ignore 
it.”124   
While elite failure to comprehend the changing political reality of popular 
involvement in a communal discourse that had previously been reserved for noblemen of 
knowledge and had excluded the presumably ignorant populace, there also existed a 
palpable sense of resentment and fear among the Sunni and Druze of Christian 
assertiveness.125  The majority fear of a subaltern minority stemmed from perceived 
favoritism of the Christian European powers toward their co-religionists in Greater Syria. 
The Jesuits in particular had founded institutions such as the seminary at Ghazir that 
molded its students in a European image, eschewed local traditions, and diminished the 
common historical experience their charges shared with their Muslim and Druze 
compatriots.126  Leila Fawaz cites the “growing gap between the rich and the poor.”127  
The former demographic included an increasing number of Christians who had benefitted 
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from extensive commercial ties with European concerns, while Muslim craftsmen and 
shopkeepers comprised the majority of the latter.  Prosperous before European advances 
in maritime navigation, their traditional role as land-based port to the caravan trade routes 
was rendered obsolete.  These inequities crystallized in the minds of many Sunnis and 
Druze when Tanius Shahin and his supporters flew the French flag and extolled the 
values of the French Revolution.128   
Fawaz and Cleveland place emphasis on the economic links between the Christian 
community and their French patrons that were packaged in a sectarian context as the 
primary catalyst for the violent events of 1860.  Following a teleological line of 
reasoning, Makdisi maintains that the sequence of historically contingent events 
beginning with Egyptian rule in the 1830s, the fall of the Shihabi emirate, the 
introduction of Tanzimat reforms, and intervention of European powers “actively 
produced” animosity between religious communities.129  Makdisi’s argument 
demonstrates that sectarianism and the resultant violence of 1860 was not uniquely 
attributable to increased levels of Christian knowledge and wealth obtained through 
preferential ties with European missionaries and commercial concerns.  It also included 
the combined effects of the aforementioned historical sequence that necessarily required 
the tacit consent of all nobles regardless of sectarian affiliation in the destruction of the 
traditional muqata’ji order.  These developments radically altered the system of social 
and political discourse that had favored elite power expressed through a rigidly defined 
hierarchy of commoners, local notables, Ottoman governors, the sultan’s viziers, and 
ultimately the sultan himself. 
Though sectarianism proved an active construct of elite and commoner 
imaginations in response to the dissolution of the traditional Ottoman social hierarchy, its 
emergence as the dominant source of social and political definition was neither uniform 
nor absolute during the violence of 1860.  Division between the interests of the Maronite 
patriarch, Christian notables, and the popular leader, Tanius Shahin, characterized the 
Christian community as it faced an escalating series of sectarian violence that alternated 
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between Druze and Christian communities and developed into full-scale civil conflict.  
Shahin advocated coming to the aid of his co-religionists in a struggle for social equality 
that he waged for the “salvation of ‘the’ Christian community.”130  The Bishop of Beirut, 
Tubiyya ‘Awn, attempted to comply with Ottoman demands for stability in Kisrawan, 
though he had no real power to do so.131  Christian notables were reluctant to join with a 
commoner while at the same time fearful of popular backlash should they collude with 
their fellow Druze elites to contain the violence that continued to spiral out of control.132  
Shahin’s pledge to aid his co-religionists went unfulfilled due to either illness or his own 
political ambitions.133  The Kisrawani Maronites were divided among themselves, as 
Tanius Shahin’s religious vision of social equality was not uniformly accepted within his 
own social peer group.134 These divisions contrasted with the relative unity of Druze 
partisans,135 who more readily coalesced against the perceived multiple threats of 
European encroachment, Christian assertiveness, and Ottoman weakness.   
The combined factors of Ottoman apathy, impotence, and an inability to reconcile 
the full consequences of the Tanzimat reforms in Greater Syria, represented another 
important element that both created the requisite conditions and proved elemental in the 
outcome of the sectarian violence of 1860.  The isolated communities of Mount Lebanon 
were rarely central to imperial Ottoman concerns prior to the nineteenth century.  The 
Ottoman governor in Damascus deputized the Ma’an and then Shihab families to ensure 
that the iqta, annual land tax, was collected and remitted to the central treasury in 
Istanbul.  Thus, when news of a novel form of revolt in Kisrawan, a remote and 
previously insignificant region, reached others, it caused an elevated sense of Ottoman 
disquietude at their immediate inability to re-assert imperial authority.136  This revolt and 
the communal violence that followed transcended the traditional tax revolts. It prescribed 
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a vision of social equality that defied the established social order.  This was something 
for which the Ottoman officials were ill prepared to handle because they had never 
considered the possibility of an alternate interpretation of imperial reforms, especially 
from a group of ignorant ahali. 
Great Power politics surrounding its European territories had diverted the focus of 
the imperial lens from its Arab lands, as the Ottoman Empire struggled to resist European 
pressure to encroach territorially on its domains.  The Crimean War involved the 
Ottomans in alliance with the British and the French against the Russian Empire.  The 
Russians invaded Ottoman territory after the sultan refused to accede to an agreement 
that would allow Russia to intervene on behalf of the Ottoman Empire’s Orthodox 
Christian community.137  Despite being on the “winning” side of the conflict, Ottoman 
finances were burdened by loans procured on European money markets that financed a 
massive military modernization effort.138  As a result of these costly distractions, the 
Ottoman authorities were unable to forcefully intervene when faced with a crisis in 
Greater Syria.  European consuls and Christian advocates in Beirut lobbied to no avail for 
increased Ottoman military presence to maintain regional stability.  Instead, the small 
numbers of imperial troops, who were poorly supplied and often unpaid, neglected their 
duties and participated with sectarian partisans in looting.139  There were also allegations 
that Ottoman soldiers were complicit with the Druze in the early battles of the civil 
conflict, did not resist Druze attacks on unarmed Christians at the massacres of Hasbaiya 
and Rashaiya, and failed to intervene in the Druze attack on the last Christian stronghold 
of Zahleh.140  The Ottoman authorities also did little to prevent the massacre at Deir al-
Qamar.  They only possessed the capability to politely ask the Druze forces to leave and 
offered no resistance to Druze attacks on their barracks at Beit al-Din.141  In the 
Damascus massacre that followed the violence in Mount Lebanon, Ottoman authorities 
were similarly unable to prevent the slaughter of at least 1000 Christians and foreigners at 
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the hands of a massive mob of Sunni and Druze rioters.  In fact, the Ottoman troops fired 
on a mob approaching the Christian quarter, though later, after quitting their posts, some 
soldiers actually participated in the riots.142 
Ottoman officials characterized the conflict that emerged as a result of primordial 
rivalries between minority sects in Mount Lebanon rather than directly confronting the 
dire situation created through their own efforts at reform. European powers and local 
elites adopted the same characterization, though they did so out of self-interest rather than 
any altruistic impulse or sense of loyalty to the Ottoman state.143  This denial of a 
transformed political reality along with Ottoman weakness and disdain of direct 
involvement in Syrian affairs, prevented any significant imperial action that might have 
prevented the disastrous events of 1860.  While the Ottomans were not the sole source of 
the political failures that enabled the violence, they abdicated their responsibility as a 
modern territorially based nation state to exercise a monopoly of violence within their 
borders.  The events of 1860 made apparent the literal and figurative bankruptcy of the 
Ottoman state and aided in the crystallization of sectarian forms of political identity 
Local Syrian and Lebanese elites embraced an actively created sectarian history that 
would define and justify an exclusive nationalist vision in the wider competition for 
power within a state whose total dissolution was only delayed by Great Power 
competition over its disparate parts. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The rise of sectarianism in Greater Syria that ultimately resulted in the horrific 
violence in 1860, created a political atmosphere that increased the salience of both intra- 
and inter-sectarian divisions.  As will be seen in Chapter 3, these cleavages were 
instrumental in limiting the efficacy of the national movement, creating disparate national 
visions that prevented unity and mass mobilization, as well as encouraging Ottoman 
despotism that squelched elite political support and confined the movement to secret 
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organizations and private salon discussions.  Ultimately, sectarianism was a critical 
element that prevented the formation of single Arab state prior to World War I, and 
allowed the partition of Greater Syria into two separate states under French mandate.  
These sectarian divisions still plague Lebanon to the present day and remain potentially 
latent under Ba’ath authoritarian rule in Syria. 
The confluence of unique historical events in Greater Syria precipitated the 
downfall of the muqata’ji system and its associated political discourse based upon 
overlapping loyalties, elite competition for power, and a sense of stability ensured by 
secular boundaries that separated the civil affairs of each sect within the millet system. 
The critical phenomena that facilitated this fundamental shift in Greater Syrian society, 
included the introduction of European commercial and educational institutions, the 
commensurate ascension of a new class of Christian notables within the ranks of a rigid 
Ottoman hierarchy, the encouragement of Christian settlement by Druze muqata’ji to 
work in the silk trade in the southern principalities of Mount Lebanon during the rule of 
the Druze Ma’an emirate, the peaceful succession of elite power in the heterogeneous 
polity of Mount Lebanon to the Sunni Shihab family, and the efforts of Bashir II to 
consolidate his power that reduced the ranks of the elite and introduced sectarian rivalry 
in to the ranks of the elite.  Even though each element had a profound effect on Greater 
Syrian society, they all took place within the boundaries of the traditional social order. 
The Egyptian invasion and subsequent occupation of 1831-9 signaled the 
increased salience of Great Power competition that permeated internal Ottoman affairs.  
Additionally, Bashir Shihab, a Christian emir, openly sided with Egyptian governor, 
Ibrahim Pasha, against Ottoman, Druze, British, and Austrian interests. While incurring 
some inter-sectarian resentment, Bashir’s actions more importantly compelled the 
Ottoman government to seek a costly alliance with the European powers.  The critical 
consequence of the alliance that forced an Egyptian withdrawal from Greater Syria was 
the Ottoman concession to implement the Tanzimat reforms beginning in 1839 that would 
ultimately succeed in destroying the very foundations of the Ottoman order. 
The Hatt-i Sharif, or Gülhane, edict that decreed that all Ottoman subjects would 
be viewed equally regardless of religious affiliation, combined with increasing sectarian 
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resentment between the Christian and Druze elites, and an Ottoman desire to re-assert order 
and authority in Greater Syria, provided the impetus for sectarian violence that resulted in the 
partition of Mount Lebanon into two separate principalities.  The southern region that 
included a heterogeneous Druze/Christian population adopted social reforms including 
wakils, or community representatives that theoretically advocated Christian interests directly 
to the Druze qa’im maqadam to ensure the equal consideration of the communal interests of 
the former.  Ironically, these progressive reforms were not implemented in the more 
homogeneous north, where the Christian Khazin family provided stewardship for an 
increasingly educated community and faced elite competition from the displaced Shihabs 
who were backed by France. 
With Ottoman central authority weakened as a result of war with Russia in the 
Crimea and widespread dissatisfaction with the lack of social progress in the north following 
the second Tanzimat decree in 1856, the Kisrawan revolt of 1858-9 succeeded in overturning 
the traditional Ottoman social order that had arguably succeeded in preventing open sectarian 
competition.  Thus, Greater Syrian society fell victim to religiously based violence and civil 
conflict, as the elites’ traditional basis for legitimacy had been rendered obsolete in the 
Kisrawan rebellion.  Additionally, the assertive and uniquely religious nature of Tanius 
Shahin’s claims for Christian equality that promised armed action in their fulfillment incurred 
Muslim and Druze resentment, which sparked a vicious cycle of communal violence that 
devolved into open civil conflict, massacres and significant population displacement in the 
middle months of 1860.  The violence was fueled by a shift in the basis of elite power, as the 
communal leaders desperately tried to create a new order that would allow for the retention 
of a modicum of privileges they enjoyed as titled nobility under the muqata’ji.  Their creation 
of a uniquely sectarian historical memory provided the basis for competing national visions 
that would rise to the fore of Greater Syrian political consciousness under the false tranquility 
of the Mutasarrifiya.  Ultimately, sectarianism was a critical element that prevented the 
formation of single Arab state prior to World War I, and it allowed the partition of Greater 
Syria into two separate states under French mandate.  These sectarian divisions still plague 
Lebanon to the present day and remain latent under Ba’ath authoritarian rule in Syria. 
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IV. 1860-1914 AN INCOHERENT NATIONAL VISION 
Several factors critically hindered the ability of the national movement within 
Greater Syria to achieve mass mobilization in favor of a separate Arab state prior to 
World War I.  These factors included a decided philosophical difference between 
Christian and Muslim national visions, the movement’s confinement to secrecy during 
thirty years of Hamidian repression, the parallel efforts of the Maronite Lebanists, and a 
lack of elite political support until the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.  This chapter 
explores how this occurred in the aftermath of the 1860 civil conflict under the 
administration of the special governorate, the Mutasarrifiya, until 1914.  
A. THE AFTERMATH OF 1860 
Subsequent to the sectarian violence that beset Mount Lebanon and Damascus in 
1860, the Ottoman Sultan sent his foreign minister, Fu’ad Pasha, to restore order in a 
society that had been irrevocably transformed under the reforms of the Tanzimat.  The 
Ottoman regime sought both to minimize the lingering resentment within Greater Syria 
and to mitigate the extent of European intervention associated with the violent clashes 
that left thousands displaced and had provoked sentiments of outrage in the European 
press.144  Fu’ad Pasha operated on the premise that the violence of 1860 was necessarily 
the reappearance of primordial tribal rivalries that served as a hindrance to Ottoman 
imperial reforms.145  Further, Pasha deemed his actions as a magnanimous dispensation 
of justice over an unruly and ignorant mob with a mandate inspired by the sultan’s 
feelings of divinely inspired “fatherly compassion.”146  Pasha viewed his campaign to 
replace sectarian rivalry with Ottoman nationalism, or Osmanlilik, as the “modern, 
reforming state uplifting and civilizing its putatively uncivilized frontier.”147  
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Damage control efforts were accomplished through a forceful demonstration of 
imperial might and punitive justice as the central state imposed its will on the outlying 
territories.  Fu’ad Pasha acted with brutal efficiency, ordering the summary execution of 
hundreds of alleged Damascene riot participants and Druze notables in Mount Lebanon to 
deter future contradiction of Ottoman reforms and modernization.148  The ranks of the 
Druze elite and their attendant political power were decimated. Those who avoided 
capital punishment either fled into exile or were imprisoned.  The remaining Druze 
leaders were saddled with paying reparations for damage caused to Christian property.149  
Further, Pasha installed a non-Arab Ottoman Christian as governor of Mount Lebanon 
who presided over an Administrative Council composed of a multi-sectarian membership 
based upon a pre-determined ratio of seven Christians to five Muslims.150  Ironically, in 
what the Ottoman authorities considered measures to help the backward populations of 
Mount Lebanon and Damascus transcend primordial rivalries, they instead only served to 
solidify the salience of sectarian identities.  Each community reacted to what was 
perceived as “authoritarian Ottomanism”151 in an effort to secure their own unique 
interests rather than pursuing efforts at truth, reconciliation and finding a cooperative 
solution to the political power imbalance created under the Tanzimat.  The fact that 
traditional Lebanese nobility were deprived of real political power with the appointment 
of a non-Arab governor, an increased willingness of Ottoman authorities to respond to 
unrest with severe repression, and the formal dissolution of the muqata’ji system under 
the Règlement organique,152 tempered any reaction that challenged the new special 
Ottoman governorate or mutasarrifiya.  Though beneath the placid exterior of a period 
Engin Akarli labels The Long Peace,153 competing national visions colored by sectarian 
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biases emerged, each uniquely attempting to reconcile the profound changes to Greater 
Syria’s political landscape with their shared historical past. 
B. THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM IN GREATER SYRIA 
The mutasarrifiya’s overarching aim of replacing supposed ancient sectarian 
rivalries with Ottoman nationalism failed to resonate with both Muslim and Christian 
communities in Mount Lebanon. The former either rejected or resented the notion of 
religious equality, and the latter viewed Fu’ad Pasha’s draconian measures as a Muslim 
ploy to maintain social and political primacy.154  As a result, the voices of secular 
nationalists, such as Butrus al-Bustani, appealed to both Christian intellectual classes and 
commoners alike; however, his message of Greater Syrian national unity based upon the 
revolutionary social concept of “secular meritocracy” that would transcend sectarian 
loyalties155 only reached a small number of Muslim intellectuals, and it threatened the 
social and economic status quo enjoyed by both Christian and Muslim wealthy elites.  
According to Salibi, in contrast to Christian Arab nationalist assertions that Islam was an 
important cultural phenomenon within a greater national identity, Arab Muslim 
commoners viewed Arab nationalism and Islam as essentially the same idea.  Muslim 
elites used this equation that emphasized sectarian identification, which along with 
unbending Ottoman imperialism, the fear of western encroachment, and the threat of an 
exclusive Maronite Lebanism as a vehicle to gain political power.156  These factors 
prevented intellectuals from coalescing around a single national ideal, though the debate 
did not fall as neatly along sectarian lines as might be presumed.  An analysis of the Arab 
intellectual movement’s development in Greater Syria is informative in illustrating how 
the aforementioned divisions within the Arab community prevented the emergence of a 
mass movement for Syrian independence. 
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Though Muslim and Druze resentment of Christian ascendancy and the Tanzimat 
reforms manifested itself in brutal massacres in 1860157, there was a significant 
“awakening,” or al-nahdah, spurred by the proliferation of western ideas through 
extensive French Catholic, Russian Orthodox and US Protestant missionary activity.  
These western interlopers succeeded in establishing numerous educational institutions, 
including most prominently the American University of Beirut and the Université St. 
Joseph, also in Beirut.  Along with education, missionaries also imported Arabic printing 
presses that combined to spark an Arabic cultural renaissance.   
The awakening appealed primarily to Christians, who accepted Western social 
and political values, though not without some reservations, since these modern norms 
originated in the societies of co-religionists.  Furthermore, the concept of social equality 
and religious freedom presented an opportunity to transcend their traditional social and 
political inferiority vis-à-vis the Muslim majority.   
Muslims, for their part, struggled to accommodate these same values within the 
context of widespread resentment at the perceived loss of Muslim primacy within the 
Ottoman state.158  The communal disparity in adherents and enthusiasm for the nahdah 
notwithstanding, the notion of a shared Arab identity based upon common language and 
literary heritage that pre-dated the Islamic/Christian split gained currency among Muslim 
and Christian intellectuals alike.  
C. ISLAMIC ARAB NATIONALISM OR ISLAMIC MODERNISM 
Tracing the roots of Islamic Arab national thought in Greater Syria takes one to 
Egypt where Albert Hourani in his seminal work, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 
outlines the life and writings of Rifa’a Badawi Rafi’ al-Tahtawi.  A member of an elite 
Egyptian family that lost its wealth when Muhammad ‘Ali seized their tax farm in 
reforms designed to consolidate the Egyptian ruler’s power,159 Tahtawi became a favored 
understudy of Shaikh ‘Attar at the renowned institution of religious learning, al-Azhar, in 
                                                 
157  Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, 34-6. 
158  Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 129-31. 
159  Ibid., 68-9. 
 51
Cairo.  The latter, as rector of the school and an ardent French advocate, introduced his 
pupil to secular subjects such as history and geography.  ‘Attar also procured Tahtawi’s 
appointment as an imam in the Egyptian army that enabled the latter to follow his mentor 
to Paris where he studied the ideas of Rousseau, Voltaire, and Montesquieu from 1826-
31.160   
The ideas of these eighteenth century thinkers impressed upon Tahtawi the 
applicability of a territorially defined nation state in which the inhabitants shared a sense 
of patriotism to a modernizing Egypt.161  Within such an entity, he adhered to Muslim 
orthodoxy, maintaining that a ruler, as God’s representative, possessed “absolute 
executive power…tempered by respect for the law and those who preserve it.”162  In 
what remains a current subject of debate in Islamic intellectual circles, Tahtawi believed 
that shari’a law was compatible with natural law and that the ruler should entrust the 
ulama or Muslim scholars with the interpretation of the law.  To this end, he encouraged 
the modernization of education for jurists and went even further in advocating universal 
primary education for young men and women to encourage “citizen” participation in the 
processes of government.163   
Tahtawi did not espouse uncritical adaptation of these Western ideas, however, as 
he warned against the conflation of secular patriotism with religion.   Tahtawi presciently 
favored the former as essential to the health of civilization, for without this sense of hubb 
al-watan or love of country “civilisation must be condemned to perish.”164  This point 
resonated in Egypt, which was relatively homogeneous with the exception of the small 
Coptic Christian minority.  Egyptian acceptance of the idea of a love of watan stood in 
contrast to Greater Syrian society where, as previously discussed, the end of tax farming 
and its associated quasi-feudal social structure increased the salience of sectarian 
identification and devolved into violent proof of Tahtawi’s hypothesis in 1860.  Caught 
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between Ibrahim Pasha’s oppressive rule during the 1830’s and the futility of his efforts 
to impose an artificial Ottoman patriotism through the Tanzimat, voices akin to Tahtawi 
emerged only subsequent to the 1860 societal disintegration in Greater Syria, though they 
were not Muslims. 
Muslim thinkers like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97) and his understudy, 
Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), disdained the incursions of the Christian West.  These 
scholars who, like Tahtawi, studied at the al-Azhar in Egypt, differed from their 
predecessor in that they espoused a different course for Islamic society’s accommodation 
of modernity.  Their writings and beliefs, Dawn collectively labels as “Islamic 
modernism and revivalism,” bemoaned the lost glory of Islamic civilization.  They 
blamed the Ottoman and Egyptian governments, not Europeans or the dhimmi sects, for 
uncritically implementing Western style reforms.  They supported this assertion with the 
irredentist Arab claims to the intellectual fundamentals of the European Enlightenment 
and felt that Europe’s modern state was directly attributable to the achievements of Islam.  
‘Abduh and al-Afghani advocated a revival of Islam in its pure form, which included 
constitutional government and individual liberties that were in accordance with these 
fundamental principles.165 
Al-Afghani deviated from ‘Abduh’s focus on an Arab centered solution to the 
decline of Islamic civilization.  The former advocated Pan-Islamism, which emphasized 
the national unity of all Muslims regardless of linguistic, ethnic, or cultural differences.  
This emphasis on Muslim unity to counter the Western threat played right into the hands 
of the Ottoman Sultan, ‘Abd al-Hamid II, who had eagerly adopted al-Afghani’s doctrine 
to legitimize his suspension of the Constitution in 1877 and subsequent thirty-three years 
of authoritarian rule.  Al-Afghani subsequently renounced his desire for an Islamic state 
and shifted the emphasis to a sense of Pan-Islamic fraternity that would help the Islamic 
community resist colonialism without condoning despotism.166   
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‘Abduh, for his part, followed a far less arcane path in pursuing his vision of 
Islamic modernism.  “He offered far more institutional solutions to the problem of what 
can arguably be deemed either Islamic decline or stagnation in relation to Western 
civilization.  He maintained that Muslim society had declined with the spread of taqlid or 
blind imitation under Turkish rulers, who were incapable of knowing the true 
significance of the Prophet’s teaching.”167  “He disapproved of their authoritarian style of 
leadership, opining that their saturation of the ulama with sympathetic scholars had 
dulled Muslim society’s connection with rational thought.  ‘Abduh desired to reform the 
ulama in order to reconnect with the rational religion, thus demonstrating that Islam was 
indeed compatible with modernity.”168  This meant the “restoration of the Arabs to their 
position of leadership among the Muslims.”169 
Rashid Rida and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi further developed ‘Abduh’s ideas 
in Greater Syria.  The former, who stopped short of promoting Arab separatism from 
Turkish rule, emphasized the two elements of “the true Islam…acceptance of the unity of 
God and consultation in matters of State.”  Rida felt that Ottoman rulers had encouraged 
their subjects to remain on the periphery of governance through rejection of God’s unity.   
This disconnect of Muslims with their State was the result of disunity of language, law, 
and equality of individuals, which were intended to be unified under the caliphate.170  In 
order to rectify this deviant course of Islamic society, Rida felt Islam needed a system of 
laws that were compatible with modernity, yet adhered to the fundamental principles of 
Islam.  Those were to be the subject of reciprocal consultation between the caliph and the 
ulama, though the caliphate would not exist as a single state.  He did support the 
existence of the Ottoman state as a “caliphate of necessity,” for besides its obvious 
failings, it provided the bulwark against corruptive foreign influence.171  Zeine 
characterizes Rida’s reforms as fundamentally religious because the latter had 
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condemned the reform efforts in Egypt and Turkey as the work of “atheists and infidels 
because religion is not fundamental to their ideas of nationality.”172 
Kawakibi’s national philosophy emphasized that Arabs were entitled to an 
honored position within Islam, because they were linked to its origins through both 
language and ancestry.  He believed that only the Arabs of Arabia could save Islam from 
the moral turpitude of the Turkish sultans, who placed higher priority on political 
concerns than those of Islam.173  In order to return Islam to its rightful place within 
society and defend against corrupt leadership, he advocated a joint Arab and Turkish 
Ottoman Empire where Arabs would serve as religious and cultural leaders.   
Early Arab nationalists adopted Kawakibi’s arguably secular views that 
distinguished between an Arab and Islamic umma.174  They used these principles to 
counter Ottoman authoritarian nationalism, though when juxtaposed with Rida’s beliefs, 
effectively divided the Muslim Arab nationalist current into two opposing narratives.  
Kawakibi employed Arab uniqueness within Islam as a vehicle of elite purification within 
Islamic society, thus separating national rulers from affecting the fundamental essence of 
Islamic principles.  As a result, he is sometimes labeled as an Islamic secularist whose 
ideas leaned closer to Arab nationalism, because his theory allowed Arab Muslims to 
maintain their religious allegiance to the Ottoman sultan while asserting their distinct 
ethnicity.  Rida, on the other hand, desired to reform the ulama to its rightful stature, 
from which it could serve as a check on the power of rulers.  These opposing views of 
Arab nationalism possessed one critical commonality:  the support of the Ottoman state, 
albeit grudgingly, by Rida.  This mutual unwillingness to dissolve the Ottoman state out 
of a fear of European domination and the theological difficulties associated with its 
dissolution, prevented the coherent political expression of a Greater Syrian state within 
the Muslim community. 
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D. CHRISTIAN SYRIAN ARAB NATIONALISM AND LEBANISM 
Butrus al-Bustani (1819-83) was a central figure in the nahdah, who endeavored 
to apply Tahtawi’s vision of hubb al-watan in the more complex polity of Greater Syria. 
Bustani, born into a Maronite family in Mount Lebanon, began his education as a 
seminarian at Ayn Waraqa and then moved to Beirut in 1840, where he served as a 
dragoman for the British in the effort to oust Egyptian rule.  He then worked as a teacher 
in an American Protestant mission, where he collaborated on a translation of the bible 
into Arabic175 and founded the “first literary society in the Arab world, Jam’iyyat al-
Adab w’al-‘Ulum (The Literary and Scientific Society)” in 1847.176  In 1859, he founded 
a non-sectarian association, al-'Umda al-Adabiyya li- Ishhdr al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya, that 
promoted the publication of Arab literature.  He continued these efforts to raise Arab 
cultural awareness beyond the literary arts, establishing the Syrian Scientific Society in 
1868 with open membership to all religions. As a result of these efforts, Abu-Manneh 
credits Bustani with creating “the basis of Arab cultural homogeneity as a means of 
fostering collective consciousness among the people of Syria.”177 
The events of the following decade leading up to and including the cataclysmic 
violence of 1860 had a profound effect on Bustani’s political philosophy.  During this 
period the Sublime Porte issued the second Tanzimat proclamation in 1856, which 
according to Abu-Manneh, gave Bustani the conviction to work within the Ottoman 
system to achieve reform rather than work against it.178  He then actively condemned and 
mourned the sectarian violence of 1860, publishing the pamphlet, Nafir Suriyya.  In it he 
appealed to his “fellow countrymen”179 to move away from sectarianism that had been 
encouraged by “education and socialization” rather than primordial “nature or 
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impulse.”180 He entreated his fellow citizens, as “one who loves the nation,”181 to 
awaken to their commonalities, which at the most basic level was a love of the Syrian 
watan or homeland.  Perhaps unfortunately for the fortunes of the Syrian nation, Bustani 
was not a politician.  He was an educator, whose significant efforts were confined to 
publishing, translating, and participating in societies that endeavored to boost Arab 
awareness of their shared cultural identity that transcended sectarian affiliation.  It is not 
clear from the different sources presented, the degree to which his calls for national unity 
resonated with the larger population, as he dared not run afoul of the Ottoman authorities 
that generally tolerated his work.182   
This lack of clarity with respect to his popular appeal did not prevent a vigorous 
debate on the exact nature of Bustani’s impact upon the Arab nationalist or Arabist 
movement.  C. Ernest Dawn in Khalidi et al.’s The Origins of Arab Nationalism, argues 
that Bustani was fundamentally an “Ottoman patriot” rather than an Arab nationalist.183  
While this may ostensibly be correct, other scholars argue that Bustani was at least a 
leading figure in creating a modern understanding of what it meant to be Arab.  Salibi 
considers Bustani’s “idea of a secular Arab nationality…the first clear articulation of the 
idea on record.”184  Tibi argues that Bustani is the “most important nineteenth-century 
Arab national writer…in whose work the revival of Arab culture takes on clearly national 
overtones.”185    
From this survey, it is apparent that Bustani at least contributed to the initial 
formulation and shaped the debate of what nationalism meant to Arabs of all faiths living 
in Syria.  It is also evident that his writings and cultural societies were not sufficient to 
mobilize a formal nationalist movement in Syria prior to the Young Turk revolt in 
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1908.186  In Bustani’s case, the lack of popular mobilization in response to his appeals 
stemmed from the fact that his national sentiments did not equate to separatism vis-à-vis 
the Ottoman Empire.  Perhaps wisely, as a Christian acting in an Ottoman polity 
traditionally dominated by Muslims, Bustani practically opted to work for secular 
equality of Syrians within the Ottoman context.187    
Another reason Bustani’s nationalist appeals did not translate into immediate 
popular mobilization might have been his sectarian affiliation.  His being a linked to 
Protestant missionary education in a time of confessional strife may have led Muslims to 
discount his message regardless of its possible merits.  Bustani personally distanced 
himself from any affiliation with sectarian organizations, even castigating his erstwhile 
association with Protestant missionaries and their educational methods.  He viewed 
Western education as deliberately exclusionary of Ottoman and Syrian history, charging 
that their Eurocentric focus “aggravates division and gives rise to generations estranged 
from their culture and people.”  He advocated a universal system of secular education 
that inculcated students from a knowledge base of shared ancestral experience that would 
bridge the cultural divide between Christians and Muslims.  He believed that such a 
system would form the fundamental basis of a Syrian national mythology.188   
Bustani supported his words with action, founding “the National School” in 
Beirut in 1863, where classes were primarily conducted in Arabic.  It rapidly gained 
popularity and included students from throughout the Ottoman Empire, enjoying 
Ottoman support as well.189  Bustani’s meld of pro-Ottoman and anti-European sentiment 
found only partial accord with Muslim intellectuals, while he found himself diametrically 
opposed to the views of his native Maronite community.  Bustani’s hopeful mix of 
cultural Arabism, political Ottomanism, and Syrian nationalism languished in a society 
that only begrudgingly forgot the events of 1860 under Ottoman authoritarianism.   
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Other Christian intellectuals who followed Bustani, such as his son Sulayman, 
Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq, Adib Ishaq, Shlibi Shumayyyil, and Farah Antun similarly 
maintained their faith in the Ottoman system while writing critically of the current state 
of affairs and advocating for further reform.190  Many were relegated to organizing in 
exile in either Egypt or France during the era of Hamidian repression after 1876.  Their 
version of what arguably falls between secular Arab nationalism and Syrian nationalism 
never gained momentum because they had neither the support of the European powers, of 
whose perceived arrogance they were openly critical, nor were they ever rewarded for 
their loyalty to the Ottoman authorities with the equalizing reforms for which they 
advocated.   
Christian Lebanese notables and merchants living in Paris founded the Ottoman 
League in 1908 that aimed to place the Arab nation on an equal footing with other 
modern states.  With the revolt of the Young Turks in 1909, Ottoman society returned to 
constitutionalism, and Christian Arab nationalists returned to Syria and Lebanon.  
Remarkably, a combined Christian/Muslim Beirut Reform Movement arose in 1912-13 
that demanded Arabic as the official regional language and decentralization of power to 
local Arab leaders.  The organization was promptly shut down, and Arab nationalists 
were publicly executed during Jamal Pasha’s brutal reign as governor during World War 
I.191 Despite suffering the same eventual fate in World War I, the Christian community 
did not unanimously support the creation of an Arab state in Greater Syria. 
The critical line of separation with respect to national vision within Christian sects 
in Greater Syria prior to World War I, fell between the Melchites and the Maronites.  The 
former composed of Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox factions were more numerous.  
Kamal Salibi asserts in his discussion of Christian Arab nationalists in A House of Many 
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“solidarity…and their geographic concentration in a…limited mountain territory” 
necessarily were more effective in their unabashed agitation for a separate state than their 
co-religionists.192   
The Maronite Patriarch and his clergy were the glue that kept the community 
together through the challenges posed by the deposition of Bashir Shihab following 
Egyptian rule, the revolt of Tanius Shahin, and the disastrous civil conflict with Druze 
elites in 1860.  Unlike other Christian denominations, the Maronites clearly expressed a 
national vision of a politically separate entity as early as 1844 in Bishop Murad’s Notice 
historique to Louis-Philippe of France.  As non-Muslims in an increasingly sectarian 
polity, the Maronite clergy felt no theological qualms with claiming their “rightful place 
alongside European Christian states.”  Murad’s Notice deliberately created a revisionist 
historical narrative that replaced the Ottoman version of an elite community that 
transcended religious lines in favor of one that placed Maronite elites as undisputed 
masters of an autonomous Christian Lebanon.  They actively appealed to French national 
sentiments, going so far as to liken Mount Lebanon to an extension of sovereign French 
territory and claiming that Maronite elites had blood ties to France.193 
The idea of Lebanism faded, however, during the political reorganizations of the 
qa’im maqamiya and the mutasarrifiya, as laical Maronites were more concerned with 
problems internal to their community.194  Lebanism did not emerge again as political 
ideal until after the Young Turk rebellion in 1908, when two members of the Khazin 
family published Perpetuelle indépendance legislative et judiciare du Liban in 1910, that 
petitioned France for aid against the centralizing policies of the Turks and proponed 
territorial enlargement of Lebanon to ensure its economic viability as an independent 
state.195 
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In addition to a fond affiliation with France, the Maronites sought to distinguish 
themselves from the Islamic majority, claiming to have descended from ancient 
Phoenician civilization that controlled Mediterranean trade routes dating back to the 
twelfth century BC.196 The notion of a Lebanese link to the ancient Phoenician 
civilization did not factor into the early justifications for a Maronite dominated Lebanese 
entity until after World War I, though it percolated in intellectual circles beginning with 
Tannus al-Shidyaq’s work that detailed the history of notable families in Mount Lebanon.  
It continued with inclusion of Phoenician society in discussions of Syrian history in 
Bustani’s aforementioned Syrian Scientific Society in the 1850s and Syro-Lebanese 
publications al-Muqtataf and al-Hilal, published in the latter half of the century.197  All 
of these discussions of the Phoenician legacy occurred in the context of a Greater Syrian 
region that did not include the possibility of separate Syrian and Lebanese nation states.  
With the exception of Murad’s Notice and the Khazin’s publication in 1910, the 
idea of a separate Lebanese entity was not articulated until Maronite Patriarch Elias 
Hoyek did so at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919.  As Kaufman aptly concludes 
when discussing Bulus Nujaym’s La Question du Liban, that the “Lebanese political 
framework, based on historical and geographical justifications…developed parallel to, 
and not in opposition with, Syrian and even Arab notions.”198  Christians in Mount 
Lebanon, despite not having to reconcile the religious legitimacy of the Ottoman Sultan 
and being geographically concentrated, were unable to effectively articulate a coherent 
national vision until three distinct versions emerged following another instance of 
transformative violence in World War I.  Despite being condemned to silence or forced to 
deliberate in secrecy like Syrian Christian Arab nationalists during the era of Hamidian 
repression, this parallel, yet separate, national effort between Christian sects contributed 
to the political conditions that made the formation of either an independent or 
autonomous Greater Syrian state impossible prior to World War I. 
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E. THE ABBREVIATED RE-AWAKENING OF ARAB NATIONALISM 
The various nationalist movements within Greater Syria developed in secrecy 
subsequent to the suspension of the Ottoman Constitution in 1877, and they were forced 
to organize outside of Greater Syria, namely in Egypt and France. There were minor 
instances of anonymous anti-Turkish placards being posted on walls of buildings in 
Damascus and Beirut in 1880.  Traboulsi and Zeine both believed that the placards were 
part of a plot orchestrated by the reinstated Ottoman reformer, Midhat Pasha who served 
as wali of Syria, to separate the Arab province from Turkey.   Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid 
subsequently deposed Pasha from his governorship in 1881, and banished him to the 
Arabian Peninsula, citing allegations of a separatist plan. Whoever the culprit actually 
was, it failed to encourage popular national mobilization within Greater Syria, as 
according to Acting British Consul-General John Dickson, “The feeling they evinced is 
more one of curiosity as to their origin than anything else.”199  
Though there was not any open collaboration between Christian and Muslim 
Arabists in a formal setting in the late nineteenth century, there were literary societies in 
Beirut that provided a forum for airing and comparing grievances against the Ottoman 
state among other issues.  In addition, there were two known clandestine societies, the 
first of which was disbanded shortly after the deposition of Midhat Pasha, and the second 
also was dissolved shortly after its establishment in 1902.  The latter society called for a 
return to the constitution and the ouster of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid, while the former was 
composed of mostly Syrian Protestant College students and disbanded in association with 
the aforementioned posting of anti-Ottoman placards in Beirut.200   Zeine attributes this 
lack of action prior to the Young Turk rebellion in 1908-09 to the Muslim community’s 
reluctance to weaken the Islamic leadership through internal struggle while the present 
threat of European colonial incursion loomed nearby.  Thus, the ideals of reforming and 
strengthening the Ottoman government without effecting its dismemberment into 
separate nation states, as essentially espoused by both Syrian Christian and Muslim 
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intellectuals, found favor with the majority of Ottoman citizens with the arguable 
exception of the Maronites in Lebanon.201  Repression under the guise of preserving 
Ottoman national identity effectively prevented the coherent political expression of both 
secular and Islamic Arab nationalism prior to 1909. 
Arab nationalists were able to enter into formal Ottoman politics for the first time 
with the reinstatement of Parliament, though were in the minority until 1914.  The 
victorious Turkish party, the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), held a superior 
political position and relegated Arab nationalists to the ranks of the opposition.  The 
former came to power making promises that were remarkably similar to those that had 
been decreed by Ottoman sultans under the Tanzimat, and like the previous regime, the 
CUP were reluctant to take actions that would actually enact the reforms.  Faced with 
agitation in both Arab and European provinces for universal equality under the Ottoman 
state, the CUP closed ranks and made Pan-Islamism under the Ottoman Empire’s 
guardianship as the legitimating force for maintaining the status quo.  Arabs were 
generally skeptical of this agenda because the sectarian makeup of the CUP was neither 
predominantly Muslim nor Turkish, and there were allegations that Salonikan Jews 
actually had orchestrated the movement.  Despite the questionable validity of these 
allegations, Arab fears were fulfilled when the CUP implemented the policy of 
Turkification.202   Laws that mandated the sole use of Turkish as the primary language of 
government and education were the manifestations of Turkish assertiveness.203  These 
exclusive policies enacted in a sectarian landscape arguably resulted in the galvanization 
of the Arab nationalist movement, though its efforts proved to be disjointed and failed to 
change Greater Syria’s disposition within the Ottoman Empire prior to World War I. 
The combined inter-sectarian organization, the Beirut Reform Movement, 
founded in 1912, and composed of notables and intellectuals was the most prominent 
group advocating reforms.  They demanded the recognition of Arabic as a language 
within the Empire, its inclusion in Parliament, decentralization of power to local 
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governments, increasing the power of local councils vis-à-vis the governor, and reducing 
military service requirements.  The CUP branded the Reform Movement’s initiatives as 
“treason,” dismissing the governor and disbanding the group in one day in April 1913.204 
The anti-Ottoman sentiment among Arabs was by no means ubiquitous, as Dawn 
cites an “intra-Arab elite conflict” as the principal catalyst for Arab nationalism’s 
increasing political strength prior to World War I.  The Arab nationalists chose their path 
of opposition out of a desire to displace “rival Syrian notables who were satisfied with 
and occupied positions in the Ottoman government, an opposition that remained a 
minority until 1918.”205  
F. CONCLUSION 
Several factors critically hindered the ability of the national movement within 
Greater Syria to achieve mass mobilization in favor of a separate Arab state prior to 
World I.  These factors included a decided philosophical difference between Christian 
and Muslim national visions, the movement’s confinement to secrecy during thirty years 
of Hamidian repression, the parallel efforts of the Maronite Lebanists, and a lack of elite 
political support until the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.   
This political atmosphere enabled Great Britain and France to draw the borders of 
two separate states, Lebanon and Syria, to further their respective regional commercial 
interests without regard for traditional societal composition.206  The partition was 
formalized in wartime agreements, including the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and the 
succeeding 1920 San Remo Agreement, which gave France a mandate over Syria and 
Lebanon effectively preventing Arab unity under a nationalist banner that would 
potentially endanger French or British interests. 
In concluding these agreements, the British reneged on wartime promises to the 
Hashemite family that guaranteed Faysal the Syrian throne in return for his sponsorship 
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of an Arab revolt against Ottoman rule.  In addition, both European powers ignored the 
findings of the U.S.-led King-Crane commission that conducted a comprehensive survey 
of Greater Syria and cited 80% of survey respondents favored a united Syria, 74% 
favored independence, and 60% were in favor of a US mandate if required.207  The 
French, seeking to protect the nascent Christian enclave of power in the Lebanon and 
protect its traditional interests in spite of overwhelming public sentiment in favor of 
Syrian independence, moved against Faysal and defeated his forces at Maysalun.208  This 
cemented the two-state French mandate, which was instrumental in creating the problems 
associated with sectarian strife in Lebanon and the tight grip of authoritarian rule in 
Syria. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Nationalists in Greater Syria within the context of a reforming Ottoman Empire 
prior to World War I failed to form a cohesive political expression of intentions through 
united action, thus allowing the formation of separate Lebanese and Syrian states under 
French mandate.  This failure was attributable to three primary factors.  First, the 
increased salience of sectarian identification as a determinant factor in political loyalty 
and action among the larger population prevented a unified Arab national vision.  These 
cleavages highlighted a decided philosophical difference between Christian and Muslim 
national visions, as well as encouraging the parallel efforts of the Maronite Lebanists 
within the Christian sect.  Second, the movement’s confinement to secrecy during thirty 
years of Hamidian repression limited the wider distribution of national ideas to the larger 
population of Greater Syria. Third, elites, desiring to maintain their commercial interests 
and social status in the Ottoman system, exercised conscious reluctance to openly support 
a nationalist movement. 
In order to illustrate the historical basis of sectarianism that significantly hindered 
the maturation of the national debate in Greater Syria, the first chapter outlined the 
competing sectarian versions of Syro-Lebanese History, namely Shi’a, Druze, Maronite, 
and Sunni versions.  These divergent sectarian historical narratives formed a basis for 
tracing the evolution of communitarian rivalries that became salient throughout the mid-
nineteenth and early twentieth century.    
The second chapter investigated the rise of sectarianism within the context of the 
Tanzimat reforms from 1839-1860.  This was a critical period where traditional 
expressions of political power and identification based upon social status were replaced 
with those rooted in religious or ethnic affiliation. This transformation created a tense and 
uncertain atmosphere of fundamental social change that revolved around how to 
incorporate the Western concept of equal treatment of all citizens regardless of religion in 
a binding social contract between a state’s ruler and its people.  The confluence of unique 
historical events in Greater Syria precipitated the downfall of the muqata’ji system and 
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its associated political discourse based upon overlapping loyalties, elite competition for 
power, and a sense of stability ensured by secular boundaries that separated the civil 
affairs of each sect within the millet system.  
With the disintegration of the traditional order, Greater Syrian society fell victim 
to religiously based violence and civil conflict, as the elites’ traditional basis for 
legitimacy was rendered obsolete in the Kisrawan rebellion.  The revolt’s leader, Tanius 
Shahin, made religiously exclusive claims for Christian equality that promised armed 
action in their fulfillment.  This in turn incurred Muslim and Druze resentment, which 
sparked a vicious cycle of communal violence that devolved in to open civil conflict, 
massacres and significant population displacement in the middle months of 1860.  The 
violence was fueled by a shift in the basis of elite power, as communal leaders 
desperately tried to create a new order that would allow for the retention of a modicum of 
privileges they enjoyed as titled nobility under the muqata’ji.  This shift in the basis of 
elite power from a master-subject hierarchy with secular boundaries to an order 
characterized by sectarian rivalry encouraged through Western style reforms, provided 
the basis for competing national visions that would rise to the fore of Greater Syrian 
political consciousness under the false tranquility of the Mutasarrifiya.   
The third chapter identified the competing factors that critically hindered the 
ability of the national movement within Greater Syria to achieve mass mobilization in the 
aftermath of the 1860 civil conflict under the administration of the special Ottoman 
governorate, the Mutasarrifiya, prior to World I.  These factors included a decided 
philosophical difference between Christian and Muslim national visions and the parallel 
efforts of the Maronite Lebanists, which was highlighted with the increased salience of 
sectarian rivalries.  Thus, the movement was divided along inter-sectarian and intra-
sectarian lines making coherent articulation of demands for a separate Arab state in 
Greater Syria a virtual impossibility.  Further, the national movement was confined to 
secrecy and remained sequestered outside the purview of the larger populace during thirty 
years of Hamidian repression.  As a result there were no serious attempts at popular 
mobilization behind a formal nationalist cause before World War I.  Finally, the 
repressive political landscape under the Mutasarrifiya encouraged elites to maintain their 
 67
basis of power within the Ottoman system, depriving national movements in Greater 
Syria of the requisite political support to challenge Ottoman hegemony before 1914.   
The transformative events of the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in 
Greater Syria prevented the creation of a single Arab state prior to World War I.  This 
resulted in foreign interference, namely French, which continued to emphasize the 
sectarian differences that developed during this period to culturally divide the population 
and geographically partition the territory in two, creating the states of Lebanon and Syria.  
They accomplished this through concluding wartime agreements with the British, which 
ignored the findings of the U.S.-led King-Crane commission that found overwhelming 
public support of an independent Arab nation.  This gave France a mandate over Syria 
and Lebanon and ended the brief reign of Hashemite King Faysal in Syria.209  Despite 
claiming to represent Arab nationalism, Syrian elites rejected Faysal’s rule, again 
demonstrating the incoherence of the Arab cause.  
The people of Greater Syria, recently liberated from oppressive Ottoman rule, 
immediately came under the stewardship of colonial masters who divided the territory 
into two separate states.  Then the French implicitly sanctioned sectarian differences, 
principally in the heterogeneous population of Lebanon, with the establishment of 
supposedly democratic institutions that were rendered ineffectual through a communal 
distribution of political power.  Whether or not this was intentional is subject to debate 
and beyond the scope of this study.  The legacy of French colonialism that prevented the 
further crystallization of a national movement, with the exception of Maronite Lebanists, 
bequeathed a fundamentally unjust regime to the populations of Lebanon and Syria that 
persists in each nation under a different guise to the present day.   
External actors that succeeded French colonialism after World War II, including 
U.S. and Soviet rivals during the Cold War that then gave way to U.S. regional 
hegemony have been significant contributors to continued sectarian rivalries that prevent 
the peaceful development of these states to their economic and cultural potential.  
Lebanon suffered through a disastrous fourteen-year civil conflict fought along sectarian 
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lines that destroyed the prosperous service based economy that had developed since 
World War II.  Syria languishes in economic and political isolation, as the international 
community under U.S. leadership has sought to punish its authoritarian regime for 
favoring the Soviet Union during the Cold War and its subsequent support for Hezbollah 
as a balancing force against Israeli regional influence. 
As arguably the world’s leading power, U.S. policymakers should consider this 
historical legacy of stunted national sentiment when considering methods of achieving a 
more peaceful and vibrant Syria and Lebanon.  There have been limited efforts at 
sectarian peace and reconciliation in Lebanon subsequent to the 1989 Ta’if accords.  
These include those between Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement and Hezbollah 
prior to forming a political alliance after the assassination of then Lebanese Prime 
Minister, Rafiq Hariri, in February 2005, as well as the National Dialogue that was 
established as part of the Doha Agreement concluded in June 2008.   
The Doha Agreement negotiated between the Lebanese majority, March 14th 
coalition, and the minority, March 8th coalition, includes a commitment to renew efforts 
to fully implement the aforementioned Ta’if Accords.  To that end the National Dialogue 
is intended to aid in reconciling sectarian differences that erupted in violent conflict in 
May 2008.  Disappointingly, a recent report from the United Nations Special Envoy for 
the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559, Terje Roed-Larsen, informed 
the United Nations Security Council that "major strides" had been achieved since Doha.  
These included compliance with constitutional provisions for a free and fair presidential 
election, the adoption of a new electoral law, and the October 2008 agreement for the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria.210  These 
developments are disappointing because they fail to address the fundamental issue of 
eradicating sectarian politics from Lebanon.   
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The United States should encourage this element of the Doha Agreement and Ta’if 
Accords as a priority over implementation of UN Resolution 1559.  Any efforts to achieve 
legitimate Lebanese sovereignty, versus the present de facto form that poorly conceals 
internal rivalries, must begin with transcending sectarian politics through truth and 
reconciliation, as well as a constitutional amendment banning sectarian parties outright and 
abolishing the communal allocation of political power under the National Pact of 1943.  The 
United States can encourage this by removing Hezbollah from the U.S. government list of 
terrorist organizations and altering a policy of open support for the March 14th coalition in 
favor of neutrality vis-à-vis internal Lebanese politics.  In addition, the U.S. along with 
regional actors such as Syria should encourage semiofficial dialogues between the rival 
factions that have been proven to lead to positive progress in the seemingly intractable 
political conflicts following the abolition of apartheid in South Africa.211  This would send a 
strong message that sectarian politics are no longer viable as a means for maintaining 
political power in Lebanon.  Nearly 170 years of sectarian strife that was invented and then 
maintained by successive generations of elites with the help of external powers, has 
prevented true national sovereignty in the modern sense for the state of Lebanon.  The United 
States should continue the efforts begun under King-Crane to achieve legitimate self-
determination for Lebanon. 
The Syrian case, though far less complex in sectarian terms, should also be 
approached with the knowledge of the destructive force of sectarianism that prevented 
coherent articulation of a national idea prior to World War I.  France, similar to the Maronites 
in Lebanon, promoted the minority Alawi sect to power under the mandatory administration.  
They accomplished this through division of Sunni territory into two states of Damascus and 
Aleppo.  They then emphasized the existence of distinct sectarian minorities, the Druze and 
Alawites, giving them administratively separate states to themselves within the mandate in 
1922.  In 1924 the French merged Damascus and Aleppo, giving power to the Sunni elites 
and effectively excluding Alawis and Druze from Syrian politics.  This further 
institutionalized the sectarian polarization of Syrian politics.   
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The sectarian divisions begun under Ottoman rule and promoted throughout the 
French mandate proved a de-stablizing force in Syrian politics.  Druze and Alawi became 
the backbone of the Syrian military officer corps, because Sunni elites viewed a military 
career as unsuitable for their children.  As a result beginning in 1949 a series of military 
coups gradually eroded the power of the Sunni elite in favor of the minority sects who 
comprised the leadership of the Syrian armed forces.  Michel Aflaq’s Ba’ath Party rose to 
power in the instability that characterized the Syrian political landscape until Hafiz al-
Asad took power in a coup in 1970.212  Since then Syria became the target of U.S. 
animosity, because an open alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  In the 
post Cold War environment Syria maintained a significant military presence in Lebanon 
until April 2005 that sought to maintain a modicum of internal Lebanese stability and 
balance against U.S. sponsored Israeli power in the region.  Subsequent to the smooth 
transfer of power from Hafiz al-Asad to his son, Bashar, in 2000, Syria remains isolated 
internationally with many latent internal divisions that are a legacy of nineteenth and 
early twentieth century Ottoman rule. 
With the knowledge of the origins of what lies beneath the Ba’ath Party’s 
authoritarian rule, U.S. policymakers must act to reduce the threatening U.S. stance of 
action against the regime for the slightest intransigence.  Instead, the Syrian regime 
should be given assurances that its support for Hezbollah does not negatively affect its 
relationship with the U.S.  Making this policy change, as well as using its considerable 
economic leverage in its relationship with Israel, the U.S. should act to accelerate a 
settlement of the Golan Heights dispute dating back to 1967.  Having accomplished these 
two measures, a certain element of mutual trust will be established in the U.S. – Syrian 
relationship.  This critical trust will facilitate open dialogue with respect to democratic 
reform.  Parallel to talks regarding reform, there should be semi-official dialogues similar 
to those recommended in the Lebanese case aimed at preemptively repairing the latent 
sectarian cleavages.  These discussions will also better prepare the Syrian population for 
the social and political changes that are long overdue. 
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